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There seems little question that in 1929, modifying a famous cliché, the econ-
omywas fundamentally unsound…In 1929 the rich were indubitably rich …the
five percent of the population with the highest incomes in that year received
approximately one-third of all personal income …This highly unequal income
distribution meant that the economy was dependent on a high level of invest-
ment or a high level of luxury consumer spending or both. The rich cannot
buy great quantities of bread. (Galbraith, [1954] 1992, p. 195)
1 Introduction
1.1 The wage share
That the share of wages in national income has tended to remain stable over time—
indeed remarkably so—has long been a stylised fact.1 Why this should be so has never
been settled to a satisfactory degree. This constancy is all the more remarkable given
the complexities of the changes in the structure of production and of relative incomes
that lie beneath the aggregate figures—after examining the share of wages in income
in the UK and USA for the period 1911–1935, Keynes declared that the constancy of the
ratio during that period was “a bit of a miracle” (1939, p. 49).
Authors have attempted to explain this phenomenon in a number of ways. Kalecki
([1939] 1990) argued that, over the course of the business cycle, changes in the “degree
of monopoly” were usually offset by compensating changes in the price of raw mate-
rials, leaving the share of wages constant.2 Solow, on the other hand, argued that,
given a neoclassical aggregate production function with plausible parameter values
for the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, the observed increase in
the labour share of around ten percent over the period 1929–1954 was consistent with
the rate of capital accumulation over that period.
Solow, however, was circumspect about the possible dangers of reliance on such a
theoretical apparatus to draw conclusions about these statistics:
The general equilibrium theory is in the first instance amicroeconomic one.…It
7
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is hard to believe that the theory offers any grip at all on the variability of rel-
ative shares as the data change—in fact this may be viewed by some as a
symptom of its emptiness. (Solow, 1958)
Nonetheless, this theory has since become the standard approach to the construc-
tion of macroeconomic models. In recent years, as noted by Stiglitz (2011), “it has be-
come acceptable, even fashionable, to use particular parameterizations, for example,
constant elasticity utility functions” (p. 594).
Most recently, Piketty (2014) has reopened the debate by focusing on the share of
income accruing to owners of capital. Piketty does not break with tradition and retains
the constant elasticity of subsitution aggregate production function, but augments it
with his “fundamental law of capitalism”: the fact that the rate of return on capital will
exceed the rate of growth of total output, leading to a rise in the capital share.
The marginalist method can be taken to the extreme through the use of a Cobb-
Douglas specification which excludes by assumption the possibility of non-unitary elas-
ticity of substitution, with the result that factor shares are fixed:
[I]f the distribution of income (say between labor and capital) matters, for ex-
ample, for aggregate demand and therefore for employment and output, then
using an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function which, with competi-
tion, implies that the share of labor is fixed, is not going to be helpful. (p.
596)3
If one is further interested in, for example, an integrated analysis of the interac-
tion between aggregate demand and debt, another recent innovation inmacroeconomic
modelling—that of the representative agent—is similarly unhelpful. With the economic
system modelled on the basis of a single representative household, any redistribution
between labour and capital can exert no macroeconomic influence since the income
lost by that household as wages will be exactly offset by income gained as profit. Fi-
nancial dynamics are likewise excluded by assumption: in such a model, there exists
no-one for the representative household to borrow from, and no-one to lend to.
However, over the past 30 years or so, while the economics profession has been
8
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busy purging its models of any features that could allow for an analysis of the macroe-
conomics of income distribution and debt, the apparently stable share of wages in na-
tional income appears to have broken down. At the same time, the distribution of wage
income has become increasingly unequal. For the great majority of wage-earners in
advanced capitalist economies, wage growth has systematically lagged the growth of
labour productivity.
It is argued by a growing number of economists that this pattern of increasing in-
come polarisation should be seen as one of the deeper underlying causes of the finan-
cial and economic crisis which began in 2007–2008.4 Themost obvious connection with
the crisis is to be found in the fact that the proximate trigger of the crisis was excess
accumulation of debt in the household sector of the United States. This debt was, for
the most part, accumulated by households whose incomes had not risen in line with
productivity growth, and inmany cases had fallen in real terms. At the same time, state
provision of services was being scaled back. As a result, many households turned to
debt in order to maintain consumption. This debt was often obtained by using housing
that was rising in value as collateral. At the same time, a disproportionate and rising
share of income was accruing to wealthy households at the top of the income distribu-
tion, setting up an increasing demand for safe, standardised financial assets in which
to hold their wealth. Banks responded by securitising the debt of the poor and selling
it to the wealthy. The rest of the story is, by now, well known.
1.2 Dimensions of inequality
The aim of this Deliverable is to examine the relationship between the functional dis-
tribution of income and the financial and economic crisis that began in 2007–08. The
“functional” distribution refers to the division of output between different types of in-
come, such as wages, profits and interest. Despite a recent renewed interest in the dis-
tribution of income, the economics literature has—with some important exceptions—
tended to focus on other measures of inequality, such as changes in the distribution
of income among different groups of wage-earners, and changes in the distribution
(and composition) of total personal income. As highlighted in the previous section, this
9
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neglect of the functional distribution is, at least in part, a reflection of the structural
features of standard economic models.
What emerges from this literature is a picture of a dramatic divergence in income
and wealth over the last thirty years or so, in particular between the those at the top of
the distribution and those close to the median. The dominant explanation for this rise
in inequality is that it is the result of increases in demand for skilled labour, driven by
innovations in technology, particularly the use of computers. Until recently this view
went largely unchallenged in the mainstream literature, but an increasing number of
authors are now beginning to argue that there is more to the story. The emerging lit-
erature, however, is a primarily a story about the distribution of personal and wage
income, rather than the functional distribution of income. These two ways of looking
at income distribution are not, however, unrelated: personal and functional measures
are twoways of quantifying the outcome of the same underlyingmechanisms. Changes
in the structure of production as a result of industrial reorganisation, globalisation and
immigration will lead to simultaneous shifts in both distribution measures. For exam-
ple, as labour shifts from unionised, relatively low productivity manufacturing sectors
characterised by relatively low profit margins and a low dispersion of wage income, to
the less unionised, relatively high productivity services sector in which profit margins
are higher and wage income more dispersed, both an increase in wage dispersion and
a shift in the functional distribution of income will be observed. The following view, put
by Gordon & Dew-Becker (2008), is therefore rejected:
[L]abor’s share in national income is not related to the current debate about
increased inequality. If the labor income of the highest-paid workers in-
creased enough, wewould observe simultaneously an increase in labor’s share
and a decline in the real income of the median worker (p. 43)
What is true is that the effect of increasing wage and income dispersion on the wage
share in national income cannot be determined a priori—the overall effect on the wage
share may be either negative or positive. But this does not imply that the mechanisms
which lead to increased wage dispersion are not also significant in determining the
overall wage share. In fact, most of the evidence suggests that, although the mecha-
10
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nisms are complex, changes in each of the twomeasures have been in the same direc-
tion:
The declining bargaining power of the average worker has resulted in two
observable changes: a shift of income from labor to capital, and a shift of
both labor and capital income to the top of the income distribution (Levy &
Temin, 2007, p. 37)
Moreover, at the top of the income distribution, the distinction between capital and
labour income is becoming increasingly blurred. As will be shown in the next section,
much of the concentration of “wage income” at the top of the distribution is accounted
for by the salaries, bonuses and stock options of managerial and financial employees.
Whether this can really be considered as wage income—as it is in national accounts—is
debatable.5
Literature which examines personal income distribution in isolation, however, ex-
cludes from analysis (by design) a significant portion of total national income. The im-
plicit assumption in models based around the neoclassical aggregate production func-
tion is that all income—whether wages or profits—is returned to factors of production,
as income, in each period. In fact, it is clear from national accounts and the balance
sheets of non-financial corporations that a significant and rising share of national in-
come never leaves the corporate sector. Non-financial businesses increasingly finance
investment out of retained earnings, while simultaneously holding increasing stocks of
liquid financial assets. To view such real and financial investment as being financed
using income which has, in each period, been returned to shareholders only to then be
subsequently re-invested, is clearly misleading.
Given the inter-related nature of the various measures of income distribution, this
Deliverable will take a broad-based analytical approach by engaging with the wider lit-
erature on income distribution and its relationship to the financial crisis, as well as
those contributions which look specifically at the functional distribution of income. It
should be noted that much of the discussion will be rather US-centric, for two main
reasons. Firstly, most of the authors who write on income distribution are based at US
institutions and focus their research on the case of the US. The “hollowing out” of the
11
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US middle class over recent decades has become a subject which has attracted con-
siderable popular attention.6 Secondly, because the crisis of 2007–2008 first erupted
in the United States, changes in the pattern of income distribution there are likely to be
of particular significance in interpreting that crisis.
1.3 Paper outline
This Deliverable is structured as follows. The following section gives an overview of
recent changes in the functional distribution of income, and places these changes in
the context of wider shifts of other measures of the distribution of income. Section
3 discusses competing explanations that have been advanced to explain these shifts.
Section 4 discusses the empirical evidence on the causes of inequality. Section 5 con-
siders the connections between inequality and the financial crisis from a number of
different theoretical viewpoints. Section 6 concludes.
2 Trends in income distribution
In this section, recent trends in various measures of income distribution are presented
and briefly discussed. One commonmeasure of the functional distribution of income—
the “adjusted labour share”—is shown for six selected economies in Figures 1 and 2.
In all six, with the exception of the UK, the labour share shows a clear decline from
peaks in the mid-to-late 1970s to around 2007-08 when the crisis struck.
Data for the functional distribution of income in developing countries are less read-
ily available, but the evidence suggests that declines in the labour share of income in
LDCs may be at least as pronounced as in developed countries. Figure 3 shows sum-
mary indices of the wage share for developed countries, as calculated by Stockhammer
(2012b). Three series are shown: DVP3 summarises the data for three countries where
data are available since 1970; DVP5 for five countries where data are available from
1979; and DVP16 for a group of sixteen developing countries, where data are available
from 1993.
12
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A new data set compiled by two authors at the University of Chicago collects data
on the share of labour in the value added of the corporate sector for a large sample of
countries.7 The authors summarise their findings as follows: “Of the 59 with at least
15 years of data between 1975 and 2012, 42 exhibited downward trends in their labor
shares. Of the trend estimates that are statistically significant, 37 are negative while
only 9 are positive.” These results are summarised in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 shows
the estimated labour share and the fitted trend in the US, China, Japan and Germany.
Figure 5 summarises the trends across the dataset, with the eight largest economies
highlighted.
It should be noted that the impression given by these figures—of a significant fall
in the share of national output going to labour—has not gone unchallenged. A range
of criticisms have been directed at those who argue that a shift in the distribution of
income from wages to profits has taken place over the last thirty years or so. The most
straightforward of these criticisms is simply that the trend decline is a result of the
data period selected for analysis, and that much of the decline is simply a reversal
of the sharp increases in the labour share seen in the 1960s and 1970s. Based on
calculations from the US NIPA tables, Piketty & Saez (2003, p. 3) find that the shares
of wages and capital in the US corporate sector have remained close to constant over
the long-run period from around 1930 to 2000.8 Gordon & Dew-Becker (2008) argue
that“one can reach almost any conclusion about changes in labor’s share, depending
on the time period examined.”
Another source of debate relates to a number of questions on the correct way to
measure the labour share, and in particular how to deal with the incomes of those
registered as self-employed.. Further, different approaches to measurement deal dif-
ferently with the government sector, the housing sector, taxes, interest payments,
price deflators for consumption and production and capital depreciation. Depending
on the assumptions made regarding these factors, very different results can be ob-
tained (Gomme & Rupert, 2004).
The usual procedure in constructing “adjusted” wage shares, such as those shown
in Figures 1 to 3, is that the ratio of“unambiguous” labour income to capital income is
13
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calculated, and this ratio is used to calculate an implied average real wage rate which
is then applied to the “ambiguous” proprietor’s income in order to impute the share of
self-employment income which should be classified as wages.9 A number of authors
have argued that a relative rise in thewages of self-employed persons relative to payroll
employees implies that this adjusted labour share now significantly underestimates
the true aggregate labour share. This is illustrated by Figure 6 from Elsby et al. (2013),
which compares the published headline labour share published by the US Bureau of
Labor Statisticswith shares of gross value added in the non-farmbusiness sector taken
from the NIPA tables. As this figure demonstrates, during the 1980s the published BLS
labour share exceeded the aggregate labor share in income calculated from the NIPA
tables and has fallen steadily since. Elsby et al. argue that this accounting artefact can
explain a third of the reported decline since 1980. The figure also illustrates that the
conclusion that a falling labour share automatically implies a rising profit share must
be treated with caution: a rising share of value added going to taxes, for example, will
lead to a reduction in both the profit share and the wage share in some measures.
While space is not available in this Deliverable to discuss these issues fully, it should
be noted that, as a result of these complexities, a number of authors have argued that
time series such as those shown in Figure 1 aremisleading, at least as far as the United
States is concerned: “Over the full period 1950–2006 labor’s share has risen, not fallen,
but once the labor portion of of proprietor’s income is added in, labor’s share has been
almost exactly flat formore than 50 years” (Gordon &Dew-Becker, 2008, p. 43).10 How-
ever, while no final consensus has yet been reached on the issue, a larger number of
authors take the opposite view and conclude that a significant decline in the labour
share has taken place. The discussion will thus proceed on the assumption that the
declining labour share trends shown are broadly accurate, but it should be borne in
mind that debate continues on the issue.
The labour share is only one part of a larger story on inequality, however. Over the
period 1979–1995, by either of the two measures shown in the figures, the recorded
fall in the US labor share is under five percent. Over that same period, for full-time US
workers, the real wages of those with 12 years of education fell by 13.4% and the real
14
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wages of thosewith less than 12 years of education fell by 20.2%. Over the same period,
the real wages of workers with 16 or more years of education rose by 3.4%, leading to
an dramatic widening of the wage differential between workers with different levels of
education. (Feenstra & Hanson, 2003; Katz & Autor, 1998)
Two widely referenced measures of the distribution of wage income are shown for
the United States in Figures 7 and 8. These figures show the ratios of average wages of
different deciles of the overall wage distribution, for both males and females. The pat-
tern of changes is similar for both males and females, although the levels of inequality
at the bottom of the distribution differ. In both cases, the 90/10 ratio has shown a
steady rise over the period so that the average wage of the top decile has increased
from around 1.8 times that of the fifth decile, to a mutiple of around 2.3 in the case of
females, and around 2.4 in the case of males. The picture at the bottom of the distri-
bution is more complex: the 50/10 ratio rose sharply over the 1980s, but subsequently
levelled off in the case of females, and declined somewhat in the case of males. The
same decline in the relative wages of blue-collar workers during the 1980s and into
the 1990s can be found for Australia, Canada, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom,
Hong Kong and Mexico (Feenstra & Hanson, 2003). However, the rise in inequality has
not been as sharp in most countries as that in the US—among advanced countries,
only in the United Kingdom have relative wage changes been comparable (Gosling &
Machin, 1995).11
Detailed data on the personal distribution have been compiled by Alvaredo et al.
(2013), based on data collected from tax returns. Figure 9 shows the share of income
(excluding capital gains) received by each of the top one percent of the population, the
next four percent (5–1%), and the rest of the top ten percent (10-5%). When the top
one percent of the population is excluded, the remainder of the top decile has shown a
gradual increase in their share of income since the end of the Second World War. The
pattern shown by the top one percent is quite different: after declining sharply after the
crash of 1929, the decline slows from around 1950 and remains fairly constant until the
mid-to-late 1980s. After this point, the share of income taken by the top one percent
increases from around nine percent of total income to almost eighteen percent before
15
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the crash of 2007–08. After an initial decline following the crash, the share of the top
one percent resumed its climb, reaching over nineteen percent by 2012, higher than
the pre-2007–08 crash and close to levels reached before the 1929 crash.
What is notable is that this pattern is not reproduced across all countries. Again the
data for the United Kingdommost closely track those of the United States, with a clear
‘U’-shaped pattern over time. In contrast, France and Japan show similar patterns until
WorldWar 2, but do not then replicate the remarkable increase in inequality found in the
US and UK. France and Japan are thus characterised as having an ‘L’-shaped pattern
of top income shares (see Piketty & Saez, 2003).
The authors also provide data on the composition of the top incomes. Figure 9 shows
this composition for an even smaller group at the very top of the income distribution—
those in the top 0.1 percent of the population by income. What is striking about this
figure is the way that dividend income has been replaced in the income of this group
by that of wages and entrepreneurial income: “the composition of income in the top
income groups has shifted dramatically over the century: the working rich have now
replaced the coupon-clipping rentiers” (Piketty & Saez, 2003, p. 3)
The story is completed by Bakija et al. (2008) who, using tax return data, show that
in the US “executives, managers, supervisors and financial professionals” account for
70 percent of the increase in the incomes of the top 0.1% between 1979 and 2005 and
60 percent of the increase going to the top 1%. By 2005, the so-called wages of this
group made up over 9% of total national income, up from around 4% in 1979. Despite
being classified as wage income in the national accounts, a significant portion of the
remuneration of such top executives actually takes the form of stock options.12
What these trends in the data illustrate is that the distinction between labour and
capital income has become increasingly hard to pin down. If the income of the top 1%
of financial andmanagerial staff in form of salaries, bonuses and stock options were to
be reclassified as non-wage income in the national accounts, the decline in the wage
share in the US would be considerably more pronounced. This is illustrated in Figure
11 which shows the labour share of in the non-farm business sector of the US, divided
by income fractile. The decline in the wage share of the bottom 95% is clear, while the
16
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share taken by the upper fractiles has increased dramatically.
3 Explanations for changes in the distribution of income
3.1 Skill-biased technical change
The most widely cited cause for the increase in inequality in advanced economies (and
particularly the United States) is technological change. Writing in the Financial Times
shortly before the financial crisis, Jagdish Bagwati argued that those who looked to
globalisation as an explanation for increasing inequality were misguided:
The culprit is not globalization but labour-saving technical change that puts
pressure on the wages of the unskilled. Technical change prompts continual
economies in the use of unskilled labour. Much empirical argumentation and
evidence exists on this. (FT, January 4, 2007, p. 11)
It is argued that technology has advanced in such a way as to increase the demand
for skilled labour relative to that of unskilled labour. At the same the educational sys-
tem has failed to keep step with its output of so-called “human capital”, leading to a
dispersion in wage rates. As Krugman notes,
the hypothesis that technological change, by raising the demand for skill, has
led to growing inequality is so widespread that at conferences economists of-
ten use the abbreviation SBTC—skill-biased technical change—without ex-
planation, assuming that their listeners know what they are talking about”
(2007, p. 132).
A key text for this school of thought is Goldin & Katz’s The Race between Education
and Technology 2009.13 In their review of the book, Acemoglu & Autor predict it will
revolutionise the way economists think about the subject:
Goldin and Katz’s magnum opus, The Race between Education and Technol-
ogy, rivals Becker’s Human Capital in ambition and potential influence over
17
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the economics profession and beyond…The way most economists currently
think about the supply and demand for human capital is still largely shaped
by Becker’s insights. Goldin and Katz’s book promises to be equally transfor-
mative.
The canonical “technology vs. skill” model can be summarised as follows.14 As in
standard neoclassical models, technology is viewed as factor-augmenting. However,
technological improvements result in increases in factor productivity occurring dispro-
portionately such that productivity increases more at higher skill levels. Technological
progress thus increases returns to all factor inputs but with the weight of increases
increasing with the higher levels of skill of labour inputs, resulting in a skill premium
for more able workers.
The empirical evidence used to support this argument is shown in Figure 12. The
figure shows the change in the log weekly wage for males in the US, divided into five
categories based on the level of education attained.
Since factor prices are determined by the interaction between supply and demand,
the skill premium effect will be lessened if the supply of skilled labour increases in
line with demand. On the other hand, if the growth of the supply of skilled labour lags
the growth rate of technological change, the skill premium will widen. This raises the
question of why “human capital formation” has not responded to demand, leading to
shortages of skilled labour and widening wage differentials.
Acemoglu & Autor broadly agree with Goldin & Katz’s conclusion that “the United
States has …lost its educational leadership because its educational institutions have
become decadent” (Acemoglu & Autor, 2012, p. 2). However, they highlight a number
of problems for the canonical model. Firstly, the model over-estimates wage disper-
sion from around the beginning of the 1990s—the estimated gap between supply and
demand for skilled labour implies a greater skill premium than that which is actually
observed. The growth in inequality slowed while the information technology boom con-
tinued (Card & DiNardo, 2002). Secondly, it cannot explain the observed absolute fall in
real wages at the bottom of distribution, particularly for males, as shown in Figure 12.
(The model is also unable to explain the shift in the functional distribution of income
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from wages to profits, unless technological change is assumed to be capital-biased as
well as skill-biased.) Finally, the fact that the gap between the 10th percentile and the
median (50th) percentile contracted from the early 1990s, while the 90/50 gap contin-
ued to expand, cannot be explained.
In an attempt to rationalise these facts, Acemolu&Autor update the canonicalmodel
such that technology is labour-replacing, rather than labour-augmenting, and they in-
troduce a distinction between skill-levels and “tasks” (in the standard neoclassical pro-
duction function, there is no distinction between the quality of factors of production, and
the skills required for the tasks to which they are assigned).
Regardless of the validity of the approach of adding features to standard models
until they begin to converge with reality,15 this analysis leads to questions about why
education in the United States has failed to keep up with the demands of the modern
age. High school graduation rates peaked in early 1960s and have been stagnant ever
since, so that the US is now ranked in the bottom third of rich countries. College gradu-
ation rates show a similar sudden slowdown in the 1980s—enrollment rates increased
significantly but so did dropout rates—so that college graduation rates for men born in
the 1970s were no higher than for men born in the 1940s. (Rajan, 2010, p. 25)
The possible hypothesis that some sort of natural plateau in education levels has
been reached is widely rejected on the basis that if this were the case then a simi-
lar pattern would be observable in other countries. In contrast, with education levels
increasing elsewhere, the US is continually slipping down world ranking tables on edu-
cational achievement. Instead, the explanation provided by these authors is essentially
a political one:
Research by political scientists and economists alike …suggests that the U.S
political system has been giving much more weight to the rich and wealthy
and much less to the poor.…it is unlikely that…investments in the schooling
of the most disadvantaged…will be taken (Acemoglu & Autor, 2012, p. 32)
Debates within this strand focus on questions such as where in the skill distribution
better education is most urgently needed. At the elite level the US still plays the role
of a world leader, and it is argued that, if the predictions of the standard models are
19
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
accepted, it will need to retain this position if growth rates are to be maintained. On
the other hand, considerations of equity demand that resources be directed towards the
more politically problematicmiddle ground. Authors are, however, rather fatalist about
the feasibility of the kind of policy responses that would be required: “improvement
requires real and effective policy change in an area where too many vested interests
favor the status quo” (Rajan, 2010, p. 8).
Given the acceptance of a limited potential for improvement in the standards ofmass
education, and in line with the conveyor-belt view of human capital as the final output
of a sequence of production functions, the search for culprits has recently shifted fur-
ther back in the “value chain”, with researchers examining the role of “non-cognitive
returns to parental inputs” (Bertrand & Pan, 2013) and the dynamics of the produc-
tion and depreciation of “health capital” (Currie, 2008). Rajan summarises this strand
of thinking in plainer English: “The problems are rooted in indifferent nutrition, so-
cialization and learning in early childhood and in dysfunctional primary and secondary
schools that leave too many Americans unprepared for college” (2010, p. 8)
A possible alternative interpretation of the data shown in Figure 12 is the following.
It is known that “wage income” is becoming concentrated in the hands of a shrinking
proportion of the population. If we hypothesise that this income in someway represents
appropriation of rents, the link with education becomes less clear. Rather, it may be
the case that the individuals who are appropriating these rents tend to come not from
the bottom of the income distribution, but, in general, from well-off backgrounds. As
such, these individuals will tend to have high levels of educational attainment. But cor-
relation does not necessarily imply causation. In fact, if it were possible to disaggregate
the group of educated individuals (say the top two lines of Figure 12) who are held to
have gained the most from skill-biased technical change, it is likely that the same pat-
tern of concentration would be discerned within these skill-groups. Thus, even in the
top educational categories, most individuals may not be beneficiaries of increasing in-
equality but, due to the inclusion in these categories of those taking very high incomes,
the average incomes for the group appears to be high.16
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A final issuewith the SBTC argument is raised by Alvaredo et al. (2013): why didwage
dispersion not occur in France & Japan? If technological change, rather than political
action, were to blame for increasing income inequality, then the same patterns should
have been seen equally across the globe. The acceptable answer, presumably, is that
educational standards have slipped in the US and UK but not in France and Japan. This
answer avoids the issue of the falling wage share in the latter countries, however. An
alternative hypothesis is that there is more to the issue than the simple technological
change story. These other possible explanations are considered next.
3.2 The alternative story
Not all authors have bought into the SBTC story. Some have noted that the thirty-year
period of rising inequality that took place before the crisis was characterised not only by
increasing use of information technology, but also by deeper processes of deregulation,
globalisation and financialisation. Aside from skill-biased technical change, a range of
other possible explanations for the decrease in wage shares and divergence in income
equality have thus been suggested.
Although these factors will be discussed in separate sections, it should be empha-
sised that several of these explanations involvemechanismswhich aremulti-dimensional
and overlapping. For example “globalisation” and “financialisation” are complex con-
cepts which do yet not conform to any widely accepted definition. Some definitions of
globalisation, for example, will include such phenomena as deregulation and increas-
ing competition.
3.2.1 Labour market deregulation and trade union decline
The period of rising inequality that took place before the crisis was coincident with
a period of deregulation in almost all spheres of economic life. In particular, labour
markets were subjected to sustained pressure to increase “flexibility”. From the point
of view of standard economic models, the deregulation of product and labour markets
is almost universally regarded as having positive effects—in the long run at least, even
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if some short-run costs are inveitable.
Blanchard & Giavazzi (2003), for example, present a model in which market rigidi-
ties imply that, in the short run, deregulation leads to higher unemployment and lower
wages, but in the long run the eradication of inefficient rents leads to an outcome in
which “workers gainmore as consumers than they lose as workers” (p. 880). For work-
ers to feel the the beneficial effects of “flexible” labour markets, all that is required,
therefore, is a little patience.
In this view, the strongly falling labour share in European states “reflects the fact
that unions have become less powerful in the Continental countries, and that the wage
has come closer to the marginal product of labor” (Blanchard, 1997, p. 103).17 Blan-
chard goes further and suggests that the introduction of labour-saving technologies
may in fact have been caused by the intransigence of unions in the late 1970s, leading
firms to react by investing in these technologies. He concludes that the fall in the labour
share is the result of a combination of capital-biased technical change and “redistribu-
tion of rents” between firms and workers as a result of changes in relative bargaining
strength.
An alternative view is associated with post-Keynesian theories in which marginal
costs are held to be close to constant and the distribution between labour and capital
is thus determined purely on the basis of the outcome of a bargaining process. Authors
from this school of thought assert that the drive to increasing “flexibility” of labourmar-
kets is, instead, one element in a wider ideologically driven attack on state provisions
and the rights of workers, to the advantage of corporate and financial interests:
The small government agenda attacks the legitimacy of government and pushes
relentlessly for deregulation regardless of dangers. The labor market flex-
ibility agenda attacks unions and labor market supports such as minimum
wages, unemployment benefits, employment protections, and employee rights.
Abandonment of full employment puts workers under duress, while mone-
tary policy is conducted with an eye to low inflation targeting and support
of financial interests. Finance therefore squeezes wages through both public
policy and through control over corporations exercised via deregulated finan-
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cial markets (Palley, 2013, pp. 4–5).
Authors have highlighted the decline of the trade union movement in advanced na-
tions as an important explanatory factor in the apparent inability of “traumatised work-
ers” to resist downward pressures on wages.18 As already noted, the imputed signifi-
cance of this decline depends largely on the theoretical and ideological orientation of
the author. From the point of view of standard economic theory, trade unions extract
rents by setting wages above the market clearing rate, leading to welfare losses and
unemployment (eg. Gottschalk & Moffit, 1994). However, once the unrealistic assump-
tion of perfect competition among firms is abandoned, the notion of an equilibrium
market-clearing price for labour no longer holds and the distribution of income be-
comes the outcome of a bargaining process between firms and workers.19 Greater
bargaining strength on the part of labor will result in a higher real wage. At the ag-
gregate level, so long as the overall demand for labour is inelastic, a higher average
real wage will translate into a higher overall labour share. From a non-marginalist
perspective, trade unions thus provide an essential mechanism by which workers are
able to resist firms’ mark-up pricing decisions and maintain the growth of real wages
relative to productivity (Kalecki, [1971] 1990).
Until recently in the mainstream literature, it was largely taken for granted that
greater unionionisation is associated with greater wage inequality. However, since the
publication of Freeman’s (1980) seminal study, this view has been substantially weak-
ened. Freeman found that unionisation was correlated with a substantial compression
of wage incomes. This result has subsequently been confirmed by a number of other
more recent studies (eg. Card et al., 2004).
Table 1 shows unionmembership rates for sixteen countries, as calculated by Fried-
man (2009). The table includes both peak and current membership rates. Member-
ship peaked in the United States in 1956, and in the late 1970s in other Anglo-Saxon
economies. By 1995, union membership had peaked in twelve of the sixteen coun-
tries. What is noteworthy is the remarkable variance in union density rates across
countries.20
This decline in unionmembership was paralleled by a fall in the level of strike activi-
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ties, as shown for the US in Figure 13. Levy & Temin note that “the rapid fall underesti-
mates the decline in work stoppages as expressions of union power as strikes increas-
ingly became expressions of union despair …rather than efforts to improve working
conditions ” (2007, p. 37)
On one side of the ideological divide, union declines are seen as the result of the
triumph of consumerism over socialism and the alignment of workers incentives with
those of managers. The opposing view finds an explanation in “a mix of three factors:
a great rise in strength and heavy-handedness among the owners and managers of
business since the 1970s; a loss of state support for collective bargaining; and a de-
cline in union militancy” (Holt, 2007, pp. 102–103) In attempting to explain the decline
of union membership, authors have also highlighted the stagnationary tendencies of
advanced economies since the late 1970s; the decline of industrial manufacturing and
the rise of services; and the weakening of labour as a result of increasing trade and
immigration. In line with this view, several authors have argued that attacks on trade
unions were part of a wider political programme to weaken labour, to the advantage of
corporations (eg. Palley, 2012; Irvin, 2011; Horn et al., 2009). As such, the weakness
of unions is seen as having played a central role in the increasing disparity of incomes
(See also Section 3.3).
Detractors have taken issue with this on the basis of timing: in the United States,
unionisation began falling in 1950s, before the rise in inequality began. Further, sig-
nificant increases in inequality have been noted in sectors that were never strongly
unionised, such as the legal and medical professions (Steelman & Weisberg, 2005).
However, as shown in Figure 13, a second peak in strike action in the US meant that
the numbers of people involved in strikes in the early 1970s were nearly as great as in
the late 1950s. Others who have sought to downplay the significance of union decline
per se include Rajan, who argues that “weakness of unions may also have reduced
moderately educated workers’ bargaining power, though the loss of high-paying union
unionized jobs probably hasmore to dowith increased competition and entry as a result
of deregulation, as well as competition from imports.” (2010, p. 28)
Finally, authors have pointed to the fact that in the United States, the decline in
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unions took place simultaneously with a fall in the real minimum wage, as shown in
Figure 14. It is thus hard to disentangle the extent that unions and the minimum wage
each contributed to the rise in income inequality. Card & DiNardo (2002) argue that
falls in the minimum wage explain much of the increase in inequality: the period of
sharpest decline in theminimumwagewas over 1980s, at the same time as the greatest
increases in inequality. They find a close to perfect correlation of the minimum wage
with the change in 90-10 ratio.
3.2.2 Globalisation
Alongside deregulation of domestic markets, the pre-crisis period was characterised
by extensive dismantling of barriers to international trade and capital flows. The ef-
fects of globalisation and, in particular, the effects of trade competition with developing
countries are oft-cited causes of downward pressure on low-skilled wages and “de-
industrialisation” in advanced counties. Increased capital mobility, leading to greater
potential for foreign outsourcing and international technology transfers serve to fur-
ther undermine the bargaining position of workers (Rodrik, 1997).
From the point of view of the functional distribution of labour, the standard analytical
approach remains theHecksher-Ohlin trade theory and the related Stolper-Samuelson
theorem (1941). However, while the predictions of the theory are partially supported by
outcomes in advanced nations—the capital share has increased and wage dispersion
between skill groups widened—the same is not true of developing countries. The ev-
idence suggests that the increasing inequality that has occurred in advanced nations
has been paralleled by similar divergences in developing nations (Davis &Mishra, 2007;
Stockhammer, 2012b). This outcome contradicts the prediction of the theory that the
owners of more abundant factors of production—unskilled labour, in the case of de-
veloping countries—should see an increase in income. Further, the theory predicts in-
creasing dispersion between high and low skilled workers in advanced countries, but
cannot account for the fact that even most high skilled workers in the west have seen
their incomes lagging labour productivity (Krugman, 2007). Finally, it has also been
shown that the labour share has also fallen within the non-traded sectors of the econ-
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omy (Azmat et al., 2007). It is argued by Feenstra (2007) that it is this failure to conform
to the predictions of standard models that has led many economists to reject trade lib-
eralisation and outsourcing as significant explanatory factors for the falling wages of
low-skilled workers in the West, leading to the emphasis on technical change instead.
Those who argue against trade as an important factor contributing to higher in-
equality highlight the relatively small share of trade in total GDP: in many countries
the trade-to-GDP ratio is lower now than it was in 1913. However, trade in interme-
diate goods makes up a significantly higher proportion of the total than in the past.
Feenstra (2007) argues that the effect of such outsourcing of manufacturing by corpo-
rations is similar to skill-biased technical change in terms of the changes in relative
demand for high and low-skilled labour. Feenstra argues that this effect accounts for
15-24% of the shift in total demand.
It has also been argued that there is a connection between the current account
deficits run by countries such as the UK and US and the decline in manufacturing.
Falling wages are thus linked with international imbalances via de-industrialisation
and off-shoring.
In addition to the wage competition from abroad faced by workers in an increasingly
globalised world, the arrival of low-skilled immigrants from overseas is another po-
tential cause of pressure on the wages of the low-skilled. If immigrants mostly take
low-paying jobs at the bottom of the income distribution, this will have direct effects on
measures of wage dispersion. The effect on the functional distribution of income, again
cannot be a priori determined, since it will depend on the profitability of the sectors in
which immigrants are employed, the sectoral composition of the economy and so on.
As well as generating competition in the labour market, globalisation also opens up
product markets to competition from overseas firms. It is argued that this can increase
demand for high-skilled employees, leading to “winner-takes-all” or “superstar mar-
kets” (Rosen, 1981). Greater entry and exit of firms as a result of increased product
market competition leads in turn to greater volatility in incomes for workers. This may
be recorded as greater dispersion, since workers will more regularly move between
different income categories (see Section 5.1.1).
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3.2.3 Financialisation
In addition to the factors outlined above, it has been argued that financialisation has
contributed directly to the decline in the labour share of income in a number of spe-
cific ways (Hein, 2011, 2012, 2013). Like “globalisation”, “financialisation” is a complex
and nebulous concept, and one that has yet to converge on a widely-accepted mean-
ing. For the sake of the current discussion, these issues will be put to one side and,
following Hein, the broad definition given in Epstein (2005) will serve as a reference
point: “…financialisation means the increasing role of financial motives, financial mar-
kets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and
international economies” (p. 3).
Hein’s analysis is based up a Kaleckian theoretical framework. Following Kalecki
([1954] 1965) and Steindl (1952), it is assumed that, in an economy which is operat-
ing with spare capacity, marginal costs will be close to constant. In the presence of
overhead costs such as salaries, taxes and interest payments, unit costs will thus fall
as output increases.21 Given the further assumption that firms fix prices as a con-
stant mark-up over marginal costs, as output increases, the share of profits in total
output will increase. Thus, in the short-run, cyclical changes in capacity utilisation
will affect the distribution of income between capital and labour. Over the longer pe-
riod, however, it is the factors that influence the price mark-up, overhead costs, and
sectoral composition of the economy which are of greater significance.22 It is these
longer-term influences on the wage share that Hein relates to the role of financiali-
sation. Hein (2011) identifies seven “stylised facts of financialization” which will affect
the long-term distribution of income in such a framework:
1. Increasing dividend payments.
2. Increasing interest rates or interest payments.
3. Increasing salaries of top management.
4. Increasing shareholder value orientation & management short-termism.
5. A shift in the sectoral composition of value-added towards a higher share for the
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financial corporate sector.
6. Mergers and acquisitions activity.
7. Liberalisation and globalisation of international finance and trade.
Following Kalecki ([1954] 1965, [1971] 1990), Hein identifies five transmission chan-
nels through which these features of financialisation may affect the wage share:
1. Increasing overhead costs.
2. Decreasing strength of trade unions and bargaining power of labour more gener-
ally.
3. Changes in the price of imported primary and semi-finished products.
4. Changes in the degree of competition in the goodsmarket (or, equivalently, changes
in the Kaleckian “degree of monopoly”).
5. Changes in the sectoral composition of the economy.
The ways in which each of these seven stylised features of financialisation are held
to affect the functional distribution of income are shown in Figure 15. The first four
features will all result in a drain on the internal funds of firms, reducing the finance
available for investment purposes. As such, these can be regarded as equivalent to
an increase in overhead costs, potentially leading businesses to respond by increasing
price markups in an attempt to prevent a fall in profits.23
An increase in the power of shareholders and the short-termism of management
will tend to lead to a shift in preferences away from capital investment, towards activi-
ties that will generate returns for financial investors, such as increases in the prices of
shares. Shareholders will also exert pressure on firms to “rationalise” and “stream-
line” businesses, so that higher short-term surpluses may be generated.The effects
of such reorientation of management priorities may translate into a reduced tolerance
of, and willingness to negotiate with, trade unions—resulting in job insecurity and a
weakening of the bargaining position of employees.
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All of the first four stylised facts thus unambiguously tend to reduce the labour share
of output. Labour’s ability to resist such behaviour depends, most significantly, on the
strength of trade unions. However, the shifting sectoral composition of the economic
systems of advanced capitalist countries also tends to weaken the trade union move-
ment. As already noted, with the rise of services and the decline of industrial manu-
facturing, rates of unionisation have been falling. Such sectoral shifts also have more
direct effects on the labour share of income. Since profit shares are greater in the
services sector—viewed in a neo-Kaleckian framework as resulting from higher price
mark-ups—the wage share will fall as labour moves from the unionised, low mark-up
industrial sector into the non-unionised high mark-up services sector. With respect to
financialisation, these sectoral shifts are associated in particular with a rising share of
financial services activity in total value added.
3.3 Political aspects of income distribution
So far, a number of related changes—union weakening, reductions in marginal tax
rates for the rich, deregulation and competition—have been discussed largely in isola-
tion. Writers with a background in critical political economy have long emphasised the
interrelated nature of such changes, and linked them with the associated rightward
shift of the political “centre” in the period from around the late 70s, under the term
“neoliberalism”.
On the other hand, writers from an orthodox academic economics background tend
to view such changes as the result of enlightened policy-makers rolling back the dead
hand of government in order to allow market forces to flourish. Any associated in-
creases in inequality thus result from the “natural” workings of the market once it is
allowed free reign to adjust to technological change, changing trade patterns and so
on.
In recent years however, some representatives of the conventional wisdom have be-
gun to question the notion that politics has played no role in the increasingly apparent
divergence in incomes and opportunities in the United States. As noted above, Rajan
(2010) and Goldin & Katz (2009) both conclude that government policy favouring the
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wealthy minority at the expense of the rest of society lies behind the deterioration in
educational standards in the US, with technological change and market forces trans-
lating the resulting shortages of skilled labour into greater inequality.
An author who attributes amore substantive role to the conservative political shift is
Paul Krugman. Krugman notes the correlation (over the period from around the mid-
1970s) between increasing inequality and what he refers to as political “polarisation”
arising from a rightward shift of the Republican Party.24 This leads to the question of
causality—the conventional wisdom holds that, with technological change and trade
globalisation leading to widening inequality, an increase in political “polarisation” be-
tween the winners and losers is the outcome.
That, more or less, is the story I believed when I began working on this book
…Yet I’ve become convinced that much of the causation runs the other way—
that political change in the form of rising polarization has been amajor cause
of rising inequality.” (Krugman, p. 6)
Krugman thus finds himself in the troubled position—“[i]t sounds like economic
heresy”, (p. 7)—of agreeing with those who put forward the radical proposition that
inequality can be affected not only by such “impersonal” variables as globalisation and
technical change, but also by the exercise of political power:
…[E]conomists, startled by rising equality, …discovered to their surprise that
the transition from the inequality of the Gilded Age to the relative equality
of the postwar era wasn’t a gradual evolution. Instead, America’s postwar
middle-class society was created, in just the space of a few years, by the poli-
cies of the Roosevelt administration—especially through wartime wage con-
trols.25
Time and again, Krugman reiterates his astonishment that “Economics 101” has
failed to provide us with an exhaustive account of the forces that operate to determine
the distribution of income and wealth.26
Krugman draws heavily on the work of Goldin & Margo (1992) and Levy & Temin
(2007) to support his argument that politically-driven changes in “institutions and norms”,
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rather than SBTC, lies behind diverging incomes.27 The former authors coined the
phrase the “Great Compression” to refer to the pre-neoliberal period of lower income
inequality.28 The latter present evidence that, given the shift in “institutions and norms”—
increases in top-bracket income taxes in particular—from the period of what they dub
the “Treaty of Detroit” to that of the Washington Consensus, the conclusion must be
drawn that “technology and trade’s impacts are embedded in a larger institutional
story” (p. 6).29
In a carefully argued piece, Levy & Temin make the case that the reversal of the
Great Compression was the result of supply-side policies implemented in reaction to
the stagnation and inflation of the late 1970s.30 They draw a parallel with the policy
shift of the 1930s, induced by the distress experienced in the wake of the crash, and the
policy shift of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In a timely remark (the working paper was
published in May 2007), the authors conclude that “only time will tell if more economic
distress is needed to change policy yet again” (Levy & Temin, 2007, p. 42).
Thus, while not rejecting the SBTC story, the authors take amore nuanced approach
in arguing that such factors are embedded in the wider institutional context, so that
politics, rather than technology, is the key factor in determining income distribution:
In our interpretation, the recent impacts of technology and trade have been
amplified by the collapse of these institutions, a collapsewhich arose because
economic forces led to a shift in the political environment in the 1970s and
1980s. If our interpretation is correct, no re-balancing of the labour force can
restore a more equal distribution of productivity gains without government
intervention and changes in private sector behaviour” (Levy & Temin, 2007, p.
5)
These authors have thus essentially rediscovered the position that has long been
argued by those coming from a political economy background: that the actions of the
state and the market combine to generate macroeconomic outcomes.31
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3.4 Summarising the argument
A clear divide exists between competing interpretations of the rise in inequality that
has taken place of the last thirty years. The conventional wisdom holds that most of the
decline in the average worker’s bargaining power is the result of skill-biased technical
change, resulting in an excess demand for skilled labour. This effect is regarded as
being augmented by the effects of trade and globalisation: as markets become more
open and competition increases, the polarising effects of technical change are more
powerfully transmitted through otherwise neutral market forces. In this view, the ef-
fect of the political drive towards deregulation since the 1980s allows market forces
to operate freely and removes the excessive distortions that were put in place in the
post-War period:
[T]he evidence ismost persuasive that the growing inequality …stems primar-
ily from the gap between the highly educated and their supply. Progressives,
no doubt, attribute substantial weight to the antilabor policies followed by Re-
publican governments since Ronald Reagan, whereas conservatives attribute
much of the earlier wage compression to anticompetitive policies followed
since Franklin Roosevelt. (Rajan, 2010, p. 29)
The alternative view is that the period of deregulation, de-unionisation and privati-
sation represented a systematic restructuring of the economic system. This was un-
dertaken in response to the economic crisis of the late 1970s and was guided by a
conservative policy agenda that first appeared in the form of Friedman’s monetarism.
The proponents of this policy agenda had been waiting on the sidelines when the eco-
nomic slowdown and inflationary crisis of the late 1970s gave them the opportunity to
impose their policies. Instead of full employment, the control of inflation became the
primary goal of macroeconomic policy. The aims of the political class thus became
aligned with the interests of an increasingly dominant and financialised corporate sec-
tor which had subordinated the goals of long-term investment and productivity growth
to short-term gain for shareholders. While a number of authors representative of the
conventional wisdom have recently begun a cautious shift in position towards a greater
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recognition of the political causes of the shift in income distribution, a significant gap
remains between the two positions.32
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 Quantifying the SBTC story
Much apparently rigorous statistical evidence has been generated to support the view
that “impersonal market forces” have acted to translate changing demand structures
due to technological change into rising inequality of income. Once one scratches the
surface of these studies, however, it becomes clear that these ostensibly robust and
scientific econometric analyses are subject to a range of serious methodological, the-
oretical and implementational issues.
The quantification and measurement of technological change is a far from straight-
forwardmatter. The standard assumption in the literature is that technological change
augments the productivity of certain factors of production more than others, setting up
shifts in demand for those factors which are not accommodated by supply, leading to
changes in relative factor remuneration. This technological change is most commonly
associated with the increasing use of computers in production. One approach is thus
to include somemeasure of computer usage as a variable in regression analysis. Can-
didates include, for example, the share of the information technology industry in total
GDP, the share of total investment directed towards ICT or a measure of the stock of
computer equipment (eg. IMF, 2007). Investment and capital stock measures require
a number of further assumptions about, for example, depreciation rates for computer
hardware and software which are inevitably somewhat arbitrary.
Given the obvious potential for inaccuracy of such measures, other authors have
opted instead to include variables for each of the other possible explanations for in-
equality that have been identified, calculate the contributions each of these have made
to some measure of inequality, and attribute the residual—unexplained—change in
inequality to technological advancement (eg. Estrada & Valdeolivas, 2012). Krugman
summarises this approach as follows:
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The procedure goes something like this: First, assume that rising inequality
is caused by technology, growing international trade, and immigration. Then,
estimate the effects of trade and immigration—a tendentious procedure in
itself…Finally, attribute whatever isn’t explained by themeasurable factors to
technology (2007, p. 133)
A final alternative is to proxy technological change either by the capital-labour ra-
tio (eg. EC, 2007), or—since computer usage has been increasing over time—by a time
trend (eg. Ellis & Smith, 2007; Bentolila & Saint-Paul, 2003).33 Given that it is already
known that inequality has increased over time—this is what the regressions aim to
explain—it is hardly a shock to discover that when the selected measure of inequality
is regressed against time, a positive correlation is discovered. Nonetheless, this ap-
proach has been used in a number of studies to demonstrate that technological change
is the cause of rising inequality.34
The use of productivity residuals a la TFP growth, and capital-labour ratios as alter-
natives to the measurement of some largely unobservable variable serve to highlight a
deeper methodological issue. As noted by Laidler (2006), “largely un-discussed prob-
lems with capital theory still plague much modern macroeconomics.” Laidler is refer-
ring to the well established and deep-seated theoretical problems which surround the
use of aggregate production functions, particularly when used for econometric test-
ing.35
The way that econometric models are specified in much of the SBTC literature is
usually to first assume that the data under investigation are generated by an aggregate
production function. The functional formof the function is then imposed by assumption—
the usual candidates are constant elasticity or translog specifications. In older TFP
estimation exercises, the usual procedure is to then calculate the growth of factors of
production—labour and capital of different types—and then attribute the remaining,
unexplained, growth to increases in “total factor productivity” arising from technolog-
ical change.
For the method to be valid, the standard assumptions need to be fulfilled: perfect
competition, factor mobility, full employment and so on. However, even under such cir-
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cumstances, it has been conclusively shown that the results obtained are meaningless
(Felipe &McCombie, 2003; Weeks, 2005). This is because quantities of input factors are
typically measured in value terms, ie. at market prices, deflated by some price index.
Under such conditions, changes in quantities of factors become indistinguishable from
changes in prices. While this can be at least partially overcome on the part of labour
by measuring labour input in efficiency units of some kind, there is no way to measure
capital other than at market prices. Thus, the residuals—whether these are intended
to measure TFP growth or inequality arising from technical change—will also capture
price changes of factors of production.
Another approach to measuring the strength of the effects of SBTC is slightly differ-
ent: First assume the aggregate functional form, then calculate the quantity of labour
and capital inputs, and finally examine the evolution of the real wage. Assuming perfect
competition, factors of production will receive a wage equal to their marginal product—
and thus the changes in remuneration of factors of production can be used calculate
the changes in elasticities of demand, and thus the imputed change in the form of the
production function (eg. Blanchard, 1997).36
It has been shown, however, that methods which rely on econometric estimates of
the elasticity of demand for factors of production such as labour are also theoretically
invalid (Lavoie, 2008). It can easily be demonstrated that instead of the elasticity of de-
mand for factors of production, what is actually being measured is the factor income
share. Labour demand functions derived from assumed aggregate production func-
tions are in fact identical to those derived from accounting identities. Thus, any calcu-
lated value of technical change based on shifts in the elasticity of demand for labour
will be meaningless unless the economy exactly conforms to the assumed functional
form.
In short, the conclusion must be drawn that the great majority of statistical studies
purporting to find proof that income inequality is driven by technological change—or
to measure the strength of that change—suffer from serious theoretical and method-
ological issues. Conclusions drawn on the basis of these studies must therefore be
treated with caution.
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4.2 The global labour force
A recent paper published by the IMF “finds that the effective global labour force has
risen fourfold over the last two decades.” (IMF, 2007, p. 7). Admittedly, this is a rather
imprecise quantity to try and pin down—the authors also note that another recent paper
by Freeman (2005) found that the global labour force had merely doubled. Nonethe-
less, a growing literature deploys econometric analysis to try and determine the ef-
fects of this rapidly expanding global labour force (howevermeasured) on thewelfare of
workers in advanced capitalist economies. In particular, low-skilled workers in these
countries face both direct competition from immigrants and indirect competition from
foreign workers as a result of outsourcing and rising trade in consumption goods.
The results of studies which attempt to quantify the effect of immigration on do-
mestic wages vary widely, but measured effects appear to cluster around zero (Borjas,
2006, p. 222). Evidence of a significant effect is sometimes found at the level of local
markets, but this effect tends to disappear at the macro level. One explanation offered
to explain this is that local effects stimulate internal migration (Borjas, 2003; Borjas &
Katz, 2007).
The timing of immigration also poses problems for those who argue it is the prime
culprit in wage stagnation: the greatest rise in inequality in the US took place in the
1980s, while immigration was at its highest during the 1990s, during which time the
50-10 ratio declined (Mishel et al., 2012).
Borjas et al. (1997) look at the relationship between LDC-US trade, immigration
and the wage differentials between high-school graduates, high-school drop-outs, and
those with college education. They find little effect of trade and immigration on the
high-school graduate-college graduate differential. However they argue that immi-
gration and LDC trade explain an important part of the increase in differential between
high school graduates and drop-outs, with immigration playing the more significant
role. The measured effects remain small however:
Even themost pessimisticmainstreamestimates, by GeorgeBorjas and Larry
Katz of Harvard, suggest that immigration has reduced the wages of high-
school dropouts by about 5 percent, with a much smaller effect on work-
36
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
ers with a high school degree, and a small positive effect on highly educated
workers. Moreover, other economists think the Borjas-Katz numbers are too
high.” (Krugman, 2007, p. 134)
Further, it has been argued that because immigrants usually take low-paid jobs,
thus tending to occupy the bottom of the income distribution, they contribute directly
to measured inequality even though the effects of competition on the wages of non-
immigrants is small. Lerman (1999) shows that the measured effects of immigration
on the 90/10 ratio depend crucially on whether the migrants are included in the wage
data by which inequality is measured.
4.3 Trade unions
As noted in Section 3.2.1, since the publication of research on unionisation and wage
dispersion by Freeman (1980), the received wisdom that trade unions are a cause of
wage inequality has largely been overturned. The key finding of Freeman’s study was
that, although trade union coverage led to higher wages in unionised sectors of the
economy, and thus to greater wage dispersion between unionised and non-unionised
sectors, this was more than offset by the reduction in variance within those unionised
sectors. At the aggregate level greater union coverage is thus associated with a reduc-
tion in the overall inequality of wage incomes.
Card et al. (2004) reproduce and update Freeman’s results for theUS, UKandCanada
and find that unions systematically reduce the variance of wages of males in these
countries (but not females) and find strong evidence that the decline in union member-
ship is an important factor in explaining the rising dispersion of wages in the US and
UK. The authors conclude that unionisation rates “explain a sizeable share of cross-
country differences in male wage inequality among the three countries” and that “our
research strongly confirms that the ongoing decline in private sector unionism had so-
cially undesirable consequences” (p. 556).
Similar results have been found in studies looking at the UK in isolation: using
establishment-level survey data, Gosling & Machin (1995) conclude that “for semi-
skilled earnings, the decline in the share of plants with recognized unions can account
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for 11-17 percent of the rise in earnings inequality over this time period.” (p. 167).
More recently Brown et al. (2004) found that union coverage is positively associated
with reduced wage dispersion, and that despite declining union presence, the union
vs. non-union differential in earnings dispersion remains and may even have risen in
significance.
Critics of this analysis, such as Gordon & Dew-Becker (2008) complain that only
around 10% of the 90/10 earnings differential can be explained by unionisation. How-
ever, as noted by Mishel et al. (2012), the evidence suggests that unions have the great-
est influence in preventingwage falls in themiddle of the income distribution.37 If union
strength primarily affects the degree of variance around median earnings, this would
explain why union membership may have relatively smaller effects on the 90/10 ra-
tio, since earnings at the very top and bottom of the income distribution are largely
determined by factors other than unionisation. This may also have some significance
in explaining the fact that the econometrically-measured effect of unionisation on the
overall labour share tends to be weak.
Elsby et al. (2013) examine the relationship between the change in the labour share
of total payroll at the industry level and the change in an index of union coverage for
each industry for the US over the period 1987–2011. The data and the fitted regres-
sion line are reproduced in Figure 16. Although a positive relationship between de-
unionisation and the falling labour share is found, it is weak: de-unionisation can ex-
plain only around five percent of the decline in the labour share.
Results based on cross-country analysis are similarly mixed. Figure 16, reproduced
from OECD (2012), plots the change in labour share in the business sector between
1990–92 and 2005–07 against changes in collective bargaining coverage for a sample of
advanced economies. No clear correlation between the two variables can be detected.
In particular, it is interesting to note that there was a large recorded fall in the labour
share in Scandinavian countries characterised both by high levels of unionisation (see
Table 1) and a small positive change in unionisation, aswell as Italy, which also recorded
only a small change in unionisation.38
Replacing the labour sharewith theGini coefficient as the dependent variable changes
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these results considerably. Weeks (2005) runs a cross-country regression with data
from seven advanced countries, with a number of explanatory variables including trade
unionmembership rate. The results are also tested on two individual countries, the UK
and the US. Weeks finds strong evidence that the decline in union membership lies be-
hind the increase in inequality of the “neoliberal four” of the UK, the UK, New Zealand
and Australia. Weeks concludes that “the evidence strongly suggests that increases in
inequality have been the result of policies, most importantly, policies that have weak-
ened the power of organized labour. Reductions in government social expenditure and
abandoning full employment as a policy goal have also played a substantial role.” (p.
11)
These results contradict the conclusions drawn by some authors that labour mar-
ket protection (as measured by union density, welfare state generosity, and so on) is
an important cause of the falling labour share (eg. IMF, 2007). This conclusion is
drawn on the basis of cross-country regressions in which labour market policies to
increase “flexibility” are included as explanatory variables. It is known that Anglo-
Saxon economies in which the “flexible labourmarket” policy programmewas pursued
most aggressively were those in which union membership and other related measures
showed the smallest declines, as well as those which relatively smaller falls in the
wage share are recorded. Thus, it is not surprising that regression analysis will find
a correlation between “flexibility” of labour markets and smaller relative falls in the
wage share. However, since it is known that these countries have displayed the largest
increases in all othermeasures of inequality, the conclusions reached by these authors
should be treated with caution.39
4.4 Cross-country panel studies
As well as the multitude of studies that test individual candidate variables, or look at a
menu of possible candidates in single countries, there exist a number of cross-country
econometric studies which attempt to identify causes of changes in the functional dis-
tribution of income. A brief summary of these studies is given in this section. For a
more comprehensive discussion of this literature, see Stockhammer (2012b).
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These studies typically identify a large number of potential explanatory variables
and include these in a cross-country panel analysis. Since these studies provide am-
ple opportunities for the complexity of mechanisms operating in different countries at
different times to become entangled, some caution must be exercised in interpreting
the results.
The problems of constructing numerical series that capture SBTC sufficiently to be
included in econometric work have already been discussed. Issues also exist with re-
spect to the measurement of the bargaining power of workers. As noted by Stockham-
mer (2012b), “much of the literature, which is inspired by neoclassical theory, equates
welfare state generosity with the bargaining power of labour”. Indices used tomeasure
the bargaining power of labour often measure labour market “flexibility”, in line with
neoclassical theoretical propositions.
Harrison (2005) uses a large dataset of around 100 countries, on which basis it is
argued that “between 1960 and the end of the 1990s, labor shares in poor countries
fell, while shares in rich countries rose”. This conclusion is questionable, and appears
to result from a dataset which does not tally with that used by others. For example, a
rising labour share is shown in Austria, while other studies have identified Austria as
exhibiting one of the strongest negative trends. The most significant explanatory vari-
able is found to be the capital-labour ratio, while measures of financial integration—
capital controls and FDI flows—are also significant. It is argued that labour-market
flexibility is correlated with lesser falls in the labour share.
Azmat et al. (2007) uses a cross-country panel of the network industries in OECD
countries (ie. telecoms, electricity and so on) and finds that the falling labour share
is correlated with privatisation, which can explain around 20% of the falling the labour
share of value added in these industries. The proposed mechanism is that “the incen-
tives of senior managers have shifted towards maximizing shareholder value and away
from other objectives.” The paper thus considers one of the mechanisms identified by
Hein (2013, see Section 3.2.3), albeit on the basis of a Cobb-Douglas formalisation.
Ellis & Smith (2007) run regressions on a panel of around twenty advanced coun-
tries. Explanatory variables are included for GDP growth, oil prices, exchange rates
40
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
and indices of regulation. Their preferred theoretical explanation for the fall in the
labour share—changing technology—is proxied by the inclusion of a linear time trend.
Based on the the result of the regressions—the time trend is statistically significant—
they conclude that the fall in the labour share is the result of technological “churn” due
to increased rates of obsolescence. This “greater churn strengthens firms bargaining
positions and allows them to capture a larger share of factor income” (p. 18). The
statistical significance of a linear time trend thus provides compelling evidence that
changes in technology have lead to a reallocation of rents from labour to capital.
IMF (2007) uses a panel of 18 OECD economies over the period 1983–2002. Slightly
updated results using essentially the same model and data are also presented in a
working paper by Jaumotte & Tytell (2007). The econometric specification includes a
large number of variables: measures of imports, off-shoring and immigration; union
density and employment protection as well as ICT capital and the capital-labour ra-
tio. For largely unexplained reasons, the ICT capital stock enters the regressions both
in linear and squared form. The measures for union density and employment protec-
tion are found to be insignificant and dropped from the regressions. In line with other
studies it is noted that countries that have more aggressively targeted labour market
“flexibility” have seen smaller falls in labour share. The authors argue that the im-
pacts of off-shoring have been overstated, but do find a positive correlation between
the falling wage share and off-shoring. However, the authors note the results suggest
the possibility of reverse causality: a low wage share tends to reduce the appeal of
off-shoring. The authors conclude that adoption of ICT is the primary cause, although
globalisation-related variables are also significant. The observed differences between
the fall in the labour share in the US and Europe are attributed to different rates of ICT
adoption, and differences in labour market “flexibility”.
EC (2007) uses a panel of thirteen OECD countries over the same time period, and
uses a similar specification to that of IMF (2007), with the main difference that tech-
nological change is proxied by a measure of ICT specified in terms of “capital ser-
vices” rather than a stock. This ICT measure has no statistically significant effects
on the overall labour share (although it does affect the share of different skill-groups)
41
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
, meaning that the capital-labour ratio is the only remaining proxy for technological
change. Nonetheless, the authors reach the following conclusion: “the estimation re-
sults clearly indicate that technological progress made the largest contribution to the
fall in the aggregate labour income share …Globalisation also had a negative impact on
the aggregate labour income share but to a lesser extent than technological progress”
(p. 260).
Stockhammer (2009) examines the analysis of IMF (2007) andEC (2007)more closely.
He attempts to recreate the findings of the studies and discovers that their conclusion
that technological change is the key driver—even in terms of their chosen proxies—is
not robust and that the studies suffer from a number of serious econometric issues, in
particular, biased results due to autocorrelation in the residuals. He tries a number of
alternative specifications in which a number of additional variables are added. These
include a more careful specification of union effects to take account of the Ghent sys-
tem, and two variables which aim to capture the effects of financialisation: the real in-
terest rate and ameasure of the stock of financial assets and liabilities to GDP. The reli-
ability of these latter measures as a proxy for financialisation is open to question. Once
the econometric deficiencies of the EC (2007) and IMF (2007) studies are corrected, the
conclusions about the role of technology no longer stand. Instead, the variables which
aim to capture globalisation, the bargaining power of labour and financialisation are
instead found to be most strongly correlated with the fall in the labour share.
4.5 Wrapping up the econometrics
Little more needs to be added at this point. The methodological and theoretical issues
surrounding such measures as residuals and capital-labour ratios have been outlined.
Even putting these aside, whether the capital-labour ratio is a valid proxy for technolog-
ical change is highly questionable. Given thatmost economies experience capital deep-
ening over time, it is hardly surprising that such a variablewill “explain” something else
that has occurred through time. In fact, many of the conclusions found in these studies
can be predicted simply from examining the descriptive statistics. Putting aside the
inadmissible conclusions which are drawn regarding technical change, what emerges
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from this literature is that the various measures of trade globalisation always show
up as significant (and are more robust than ICT proxies). Measures of union density
and labour bargaining power are often significant, but estimated effects are weak—a
number of reasons why this may be the case have already been discussed. In any case,
there is good evidence that trade unions do reduce wage inequality, contrary to much
neoclassical received wisdom. Finally, the evidence on financialisation is thinner on
the ground and harder to interpret. As noted previously, this is a complex concept and
difficult to quantify. Caution must therefore be exercised in concluding that financial-
isation is a driver of inequality based on the evidence available so far, although there
are indications that this is the case.
5 From inequality to crisis
5.1 The indebted household
5.1.1 Debt as insurance mechanism
The most intuitively obvious link between falling or stagnating wages and financial cri-
sis is debt. The period preceding the crisis was marked by an enormous run-up of
private-sector debt and, in particular, a significant accumulation of debt in the house-
hold sector. At the time, this was not seen as cause for concern among most academic
economists or policy makers, since rising leverage ratios were accompanied by rising
asset prices so that the net worth of households was fairly stable:
In evaluating household debt burdens, onemust remember that debt-to-income
ratios have been rising for at least a half century. With household assets ris-
ing aswell, the ratio of net worth to income is currently somewhat higher than
its long-run average. So long as financial intermediation continues to expand,
both household debt and assets are likely to rise faster than income…Overall,
the household sector seems to be in good shape, andmuch of the apparent in-
crease in the household sector’s debt ratios over the past decade reflects fac-
tors that do not suggest increasing household financial stress. (Greenspan,
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2004)
Even at the time however, there were detractors. Five years previous to Greenspan’s
sanguine remarks, Wynne Godley made the following prediction:
Moreover, if, per impossibile, the growth in net lending and the growth in
money supply growth were to continue for another eight years, the implied
indebtedness of the private sector would then be so extremely large that a
sensational day of reckoning could then be at hand. (Godley, 1999, p. 11)40
And so it turned out. Yet, before the crisis struck, the view was widely held that
the observed increases in household debt were simply the benign result of efficient
financial markets performing their role in allowing households to smooth their con-
sumption expenditures. Along with Greenspan, this view was particularly associated
with the work of Krueger & Perri (2003, 2006).41
While not denying the large increases in income inequality that were taking place,
these authors argued that what matters for welfare is consumption outcomes, rather
than equality of income per se. In well-functioning financial markets, agents faced
with a higher volatility of “transitory components of income” will use financial markets
to prevent that volatility feeding through into consumption “shocks”. Further, greater
variance in earnings doesn’t matter so long as if everyone gets a turn—if the large
bonuses and other benefits handed out at the top of the wage structure go to different
households every year, there is no reason to view this as an inequitable outcome.
The Krueger-Perri-Greenspan argument can thus be summarised as follows. In-
creased competition as a result of deregulation gave rise to a greater volatility of in-
come. Households could mitigate the effects of this volatility on consumption through
interaction on the financial markets. The accumulation of debt stocks were thus just
the result of the endogenous evolution of the financial system in response to “demand”
from households.
Researchers thus set out to determine the relationship between income inequality
and consumption inequality, by examining survey data. These studies concluded that
“the increase in income inequality for the U.S. in the last 25 years has not been accom-
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panied by a substantial increase in consumption inequality” (Krueger & Perri, 2006, p.
186).42
In these, and similar studies, a distinction is drawn between “within-group” and
“between-group” income and consumption inequality, with the assumption being that
“between-group” inequality—with groups defined in terms of age, sex, ethnicity, ed-
ucation and so on—will be permanent, because it results from fixed characteristics
of those groups. On the other hand, “within-group” inequality is taken as a proxy for
transitory changes in income arising from insurable idiosyncratic income shocks.43
Krueger & Perri find that in both cases, consumption inequality did not rise signifi-
cantly. However, in the case of income inequality, it was found that this remained fairly
stable and closely tracked consumption inequality in the between-group case only. In
the case of within-group inequality, however, this increased much more markedly than
consumption inequality, leading the authors to conclude that increasing consumer debt
was simply the outcome of households insuring themselves against idiosyncratic in-
come shocks.44
Aside from the obviously problematic inference that all variance in income of, for ex-
ample, university-educatedmiddle-aged blackmales is due to transitory shocks, these
studies suffered from a number of othermethodological and data-related problems. In
particular, the total consumption implied by the survey data used differs significantly
from that in NIPA accounts, and the divergence worsens over the period under inves-
tigation.45
These studies added to an already large literature that attempts to disentangle the
complex and simultaneous changes that have occurred in the structure and evolution of
wages in the U.S. Authors have tried to estimate the relative importance of permanent
and transitory wage dispersion in the observed overall increase, the degree to which
incomemobility has changed over time and the degree towhich changes in income feed
into changes in consumption. Understanding how these changes have fed through into
changes in the labour share introduces an additional layer of complexity.
In an early contribution, Gottschalk & Moffit (1994) showed that around one third
of the increase in wage inequality of white males was due to higher volatility, while
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around two-thirds could be attributed to permanent shifts. These results were sub-
sequently updated in Moffitt & Gottschalk (2008), in which it is shown that volatility
increases levelled off after the 1990s, with permanent increases in wage dispersion
playing a more significant role subsequently. Cutler & Katz (1992) examined the rela-
tionship between changes in income and changes in consumption for different quintiles
of the population. They concluded that in all except the second-highest income quintile,
consumption changes were proportional to income changes—essentially a Keynesian
“consumption function” type of effect. Furthermore it was noted that in the very lowest
quintile, consumption fell more than proportionally with income (Cutler & Katz, 1992),
and that the degree of income volatility was greatest for those in the lowest quintile
(Gottschalk & Moffit, 1994). More recently Kopczuk et al. (2010) examined Social Se-
curity Administration data and concluded that virtually all of the increase in inequality
was due to permanent shifts, and further that earnings mobility at the top of the distri-
bution had not increased. Overall mobility had increased somewhat, but this was due
entirely to a decrease in the gender earnings gap. For men taken separately, income
mobility had decreased slightly. Similar results on mobility were found by Bradbury
& Katz (2002) who concluded: “Compared to 30 years ago, families at the bottom are
poorer relative to families at the top and also a bit more stuck there. Mobility alone has
not and is not likely to counteract the hardships caused by increasing inequality” (p. 5).
The patterns that emerged from these studies were thus (1) permanent shifts in in-
come were at least as important as transitory effects, (2) the poorest faced the greatest
uncertainty and instability in income, (3) the poorest were least likely to use credit to
offset income volatility and (4) for most, the chances of moving into a higher income
bracket had not improved.
Despite this substantial volume of evidence undermining the Kruger-Perri analy-
sis, van Treeck & Sturn note that their results were widely reported in reputable news
sources as established facts (2012, p. 13).
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5.1.2 Keeping up with the Joneses: populist credit expansion
Authors less ideologically committed to the distributional neutrality of market out-
comes have sought to consider other reasons why income and consumption may sys-
tematically diverge over time, leading to the accumulation of debt stocks. Rather than
strict adherence to the notion that well-being is determined entirely at the atomistic
level based on individual consumption preferences, these authors allow for the possi-
bility that the social significance of consumption choices and habit formation resulting
from past income and consumption patterns also matter.
The macroeconomic theory of consumption which underpins the debt-as-insurance
view is Friedman’s (1957) “permanent income hypotheses”. Friedman’s intervention
was an attack on Duesenberry’s (1949) “relative income hypothesis”. Duesenberry had
proposed a modified version of the consumption function in which the “demonstra-
tion effects” that occur as individuals experience the higher-quality goods consumed
by those on higher incomes affect the consumption decisions of individuals on lower
incomes.46
Much of the literature on imitative consumption behaviour can ultimately be traced
back to Veblen ([1899] 1919), who argued that in a society in which welfare depends on
social status, and social status is gained through “conspicuous consumption”, individ-
ual will make socially-determined consumption choices. With the advent of increasing
mathematical formalisation of economic models, such social status models fell out
of favour, while those such as Duisenberry who tried to understand the broader de-
terminants of consumption and saving patterns were denounced for “psychologizing”
(Mason, 2000).
It is interesting to note that the period during which the debates took place which
led to the abandonment of socially-embedded theories of consumption and saving was
that of the 1950s and 1960s, the era of the “great compression”. By the time the “great
divergence” in income inequality got underway in the 1970s, formalised objective utility
theory was in firm control. As economic reality was headed in one direction, theory
appeared to have fixed a course in the other:
Beginning in the 1980s, luxury goods markets expanded dramatically, with
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both upscaling of goods and services and product innovation at the high end.…Curiously,
consumption studies, which were busy rejecting the models that made sense
of this behaviour, had little to say about these developments. Perhaps they
had thrown out the proverbial Veblenian baby with the bathwater. (Schor,
2007)
Nonetheless, a number of authors have returned to the ideas of Veblen and Duisen-
berry, albeit largely within the framework of optimising behaviour. In particular, Robert
H. Frank has developed the concept of “positional externalities” in which the utility
gained from the possession or consumption of “positional goods” can be affected by
the purchasing behaviour of others. This leads to “expenditure cascades” as those on
lower incomes attempt to imitate the consumption patterns of the better off (Frank,
1985, 2005). In a similar vein, Bagwell & Bernheim (1996) present a model in which in-
formational asymmetries that prevent agents from displaying their true relative wealth
can be overcome through the “signalling” effects of conspicuous consumption. Through
such sanitising reductionism, Veblen’s ideas become safe enough to publish in the
American Economic Review.
The significance of all this lies in the fact that “liberal” academic economists face
considerable difficulties in reconciling their beliefs about the operation of the mar-
ket economy with what is—to all but the most ideologically blinkered—an undeniable
empirical fact: that in the period before the financial crisis, debt was accumulated by
households on average and below-average incomes because wages had systematically
lagged productivity growth and, in many cases, had fallen in real terms. At the same
time as average incomes stagnated or fell, the security of those incomes declined as
increased competition and deregulation led to a shift away from permanent employ-
ment to more precarious (or “flexible” in the official terminology) forms of contracting.
In order to maintain what would be seen by most as a basic minimum standard of liv-
ing, ordinary families were forced into debt. At the aggregate level, the saving rates
of the household sector not only displayed a secular and persistent fall, they become
negative in the period before the crisis.47
Academic economists who argue that the accumulation of debt in the period pre-
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ceding the crisis was not simply a consumption-smoothing reaction to increased mo-
bility of income (eg. Rajan, 2010; Stiglitz, 2008; Krugman, 2007; Kumhof & Rancière,
2010), thus, either implicitly or explicitly, are assuming some kind of socially-imitative,
relative-income, or habit-persistence type of consumer behaviour.
This then leads to the question of what enabled households to accumulate such
large and unsustainable debt stocks? On this question, Rajan takes the view that in
order to mitigate the political consequences of declines in the relative incomes of me-
dian households, the U.S. government acted to create an environment in which credit
extension allowed those families to “keep up with the Joneses”:
Stripped to its essentials the argument is that if somehow the consumption
of middle-class householders keeps up, if they can afford a new car every
few years and the occasional exotic holiday, perhaps they will pay less at-
tention to their stagnant monthly paychecks …the political response …was to
expand lending to households, especially low-income ones …easy credit has
been used as a palliative throughout history by governments that are unable
to address the deeper anxieties of the middle class directly. (Rajan, 2010, p.
9)
To support this argument, Rajan emphasises the role of the government in setting
up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a way to enable lower income households to obtain
access to consumption credit.
On the other hand, Stiglitz (2010) takes issue with this view that populist credit ex-
pansion was undertaken by a government afraid of the electoral consequences of de-
clining real incomes. Instead, he points to problems of incentives in the financial sys-
tem, and in turn to the failure of regulators. Stiglitz points out that, at the time, Fannie
and Freddie were not making sub-prime loans, were not involved in commercial real
estate and were not dealing derivatives.
The most telling point though is that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s mandate
was for “conforming loans”, loans to themiddle class. The banks jumped into
subprime mortgages—an area where, at the time, Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae were not making loans—-without any incentives from the government.
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This group of authors therefore accept the fact that inequality led to debt, and that
debt led to crisis, but notably fail to reach a consensus on the incentives and mecha-
nisms that lay behind the expansion of lending.
5.2 The macroeconomics of inequality
The problem wasn’t that consumers lived beyond their means. It was that
their means didn’t keep up with what the growing economy was capable of
producing at or near full-employment. A larger and larger share of total in-
come went to people at the top.
So in the longer term, it’s hard to see where the buying power will come from
unless America’s vast middle class has more take-home pay. Yet the econ-
omy is moving in exactly the opposite direction: Businesses continue to slash
payrolls. And the hourly wage of the typical American with a job continues to
drop, adjusted for inflation. (Reich, 2010)
The significance of income distribution in the possible crisis transmission mecha-
nisms discussed so far lies primarily with the potential for shifts in income distribution
to induce changes in the leverage of economic agents, particularly those at the bottom
end of the income distribution. However these shifts are always the outcome of indi-
vidual decisions at the microeconomic level, in response to changing income patterns.
As such, the potential for shifts in income distribution to have wider repercussions
on macroeconomic dynamics is largely overlooked. To a significant extent, this is the
result of the analysis taking place against the either implicit or explicit theoretical back-
ground of general equilibrium, in which deviations from full-employment equilibrium
are the result of transitory shocks, either through mistaken policy interventions or be-
cause of changes in technology and preferences. In such a system, the mismatch be-
tween the demand and supply of skilled labour leads to a change in relative wages,
and the system is thus not displaced from equilibrium, although it could be argued
that resulting factor allocation is sub-optimal from the point of view of productivity and
growth.
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From a different theoretical standpoint, a number of authors have argued that shifts
in the functional distribution of income will have persistent effects on aggregate de-
mand, and thus on output and employment. In the case that these shifts have led to
reduced aggregate demand, the result is a stagnationary tendency that can only be
overcome through, for example an export surplus or the extension of debt to the house-
holds sector. Such a framework allows for the integration of income distribution with
both macroeconomic effects and domestic and international financing positions.
The origin of this theoretical framework is the “neo-Kaleckian” growthmodel which
originated in thework of Rowthorn (1981), Taylor (1983) andDutt (1984). As in themodel
used by Hein (2013) (see Section 3.2.3), these authors make the assumption that when
the economy is operating with spare capacity, marginal costs will be close to constant
and unit costs will thus either also be constant or—in the presence of overhead costs—
falling.48 Given the further assumption that firms fix prices as amark-up overmarginal
costs, the main determinant of the functional distribution of income will the ratio of the
price mark-up to labour costs.49
In both the originalmodels of Kalecki andSteindl and themore recent neo-Kaleckian
growthmodels, the assumption of a higher propensity to save out of profits than wages
leads to the outcome that a redistribution of income from profits to wages results in an
increase in aggregate demand. Under the assumption that either a fall in spare pro-
ductive capacity or an increase in profits will induce firms to raise the rate of invest-
ment, the result is that higher real wages will be associated with higher growth rates.
Growth is thus said to be “wage-led”. Conversely, a decrease in the price mark-up or,
equivalently, a fall in the real wage will lead to a fall in the share of wages in national
income and a fall in aggregate demand. The resulting excess capacity and fall in the
rate of profit trigger a reduction in the rate of investment, resulting in stagnationary
tendencies.50
It was shown by Bhaduri & Marglin (1990) that, by adjusting the assumptions made
regarding the factors that determine investment so that excess capacity and the profit
margin have clearly separated effects (which operate in different directions), the result
that growth will always be wage-led no longer holds. Instead, depending on the rel-
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ative strength of the effects of income redistribution on consumption and investment
demand respectively, the overall effect on aggregate demand of an increase in the real
wage may be either positive—if consumption is more sensitive—or negative—in the
case that investment is more sensitive. As a result, growth may be either profit-led or
wage-led.
The theoretical framework introduced by Bhaduri & Marglin (often referred to as
the post-Kaleckian model) has been adapted to form the basis of a large empirical
literature. This literature uses econometric estimations of consumption and invest-
ment functions to classify economies as conforming to either “wage-led”or “profit-led”
growth regimes.51 These regime classifications refer to the structural characteristics
of the economies under consideration and are thus considered to be determined in a
way that is largely outside of policy control. However, it is assumed that government
does take a direct influence in determining the distribution of income as a result of, for
example, taxation, social security and labour market policies.52
The overall outcome in terms of aggregate demand of government policies that af-
fect the distribution of income is thus held to depend on the underlying growth regime.
In either the case of redistribution in favour of profits in a wage-led demand regime,
or in favour of wages in a profit-led regime, the outcome will be to introduce stagna-
tionary tendencies. On this basis, it is argued that four broad outcomes are possible:
two expansionary and two stagnationary. These are summarised in Table 2: the two
expansionary possibilities correspond to “trickle-down capitalism” and “social Keyne-
sianism”, while the stagnationary outcomes can be characterised as “doomed social
reforms” and the unstable case arising from redistribution in favour of profits under a
wage-led regime.
It is the last of these outcomes that authors writing from the wage-led growth per-
spective have focused on: that of redistribution from wages to profits in the context of
a wage-led structural growth regime. As discussed in Section 2, there is strong evi-
dence of a decline the share of wages in both developed and developing countries over
the past three decades or so. At the same time, on the basis of empirical studies, it is
argued that manymajor world economies can be classified as wage-led, at least on the
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basis of their domestic aggregate demand characteristics.53 In the face of government
policies that have weakened the position of labour relative to capital in these countries,
the outcome has been stagnant growth, requiring these countries to turn to alternative
sources than domestic income to provide the aggregate demand required to prevent
recession.
Two primary strategies have been identified for such countries: growthmay become
either “debt-led”, or “export-led”. In the first regime, aggregate demand is sustained
by the extension of credit to households in order to maintain consumption expendi-
tures. A connection is posited between, on the one hand, the increasing use of debt by
households to finance consumption and, on the other, price increases in housing and
stock markets. The effects of these rising asset prices are held to be twofold: wealth
effects arising as a result of capital gains may stimulate demand for credit-financed
consumption from households. At the same, rising nominal wealth provides house-
holds with the collateral necessary to obtain that credit, for example by re-mortgaging
housing that is rising in value. In the second, “export-led” regime, a trade surplus
provides the required aggregate demand to maintain growth, given an insufficient real
wages rate.
Examples of debt-led economies are the United States and the United Kingdom,
while Germany and China provide the exemplars of export-led growth.54 In both cases,
an inevitable side-effect of the strategy is the accumulation of financial imbalances. In
the case of a debt-led regime, those imbalancesmaterialise as the bank debt of house-
holds. In the case of export-led regimes, financial imbalances lead to the accumulation
of international financial positions at the expense of those countries which trade with
export-led economies. These stocks of financial liabilities may be either public sector
(as in the case of Greece, for example) or private sector (as in the case of Spain).
Thus, the introduction of government policy to weaken the bargaining position of
labour leads to stagnationary tendencies. The drive to overcome these stagnationary
tendencies through debt-led and export-led regimes is strengthened by government
policy shifts to deregulate financial markets, allowing for the accumulation of both do-
mestic and cross-border financial positions to cover the rising imbalances. This line of
53
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
argument is summarised by Stockhammer:
[T]he economic imbalances that caused the present crisis should be thought
of as the outcome of the interaction of the effects of financial deregulation
with the macroeconomic effects of rising inequality. Economic imbalances
should be viewed as the result of interaction between inequality and financial
deregulation (2012a, p. 1)
In this view, a number of self-reinforcing macroeconomic mechanisms thus com-
bine to generate financial imbalances at both the domestic and international level.
The fall in the wage share results in deficient aggregate demand and weak investment
growth. To compensate for these stagnationary tendencies, two broad growth strate-
gies then emerge, facilitated by financial deregulation: debt-led and export-led growth.
So long as global growth is sustained through such strategies, the inevitable result is
the accumulation of both public and private debt stocks.55
One aspect that this macroeconomic analysis does not explicitly discuss is the rela-
tionship between the labour share and the other measures of inequality that are dis-
cussed in other strands of the literature. In particular, in the post-Kaleckian theoretical
framework on which the analysis is based, shifts in the aggregate wage share derive
from changes in output in the short run and changes in the average price mark up
in the longer run. However, what is not discussed is the extent to which these long-
run shifts are the result of changes in mark-ups at the level of individual industries,
or shifts between industries with different mark-ups. Empirical evidence presented
by other authors, (eg. IMF, 2007; Böckerman & Maliranta, 2011) suggests that, in-
stead of pricing and bargaining effects at the industry level, much of the aggregate
change arises from shifts in economic structure away from the high-markup and low-
productivity manufacturing sector towards services industries which are characterised
by higher markups (and lower unionisation). However, other authors such as Karabar-
bounis & Neiman (2013) have found the opposite to be the case: most of the aggregate
decline is due to “share” rather than “shift” effects.
Finally, there are potential issues with the econometric evidence presented. This
evidence uses adjusted wages shares as discussed in Section 2 as a measure of the
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“wage share”. However, in Kalecki’s original formulation it is the wages ofmanufactur-
ingworkers upon which pricemarkups are set. This is acknowledged in the framework
used by Hein (Section 3.2.3) by including salaries in overhead costs. However, this dis-
tinction is not maintained in the econometric work, presumably due to data limitations.
This issue is potentially exacerbated by the dramatic dispersion of wage incomeswithin
the “labour share” in the Anglo Saxon economies. However, correcting for these issues
would largely strengthen the macroeconomic argument outlined above, since any re-
sulting redefinition of the “wage share” would likely show an even greater decline.
5.3 The view from the top: wealth concentration
The literature discussed thus far has, inasmuch as a connection between inequality
and the crisis is accepted, analysed this connection almost exclusively in terms of the
relationship between inequality and debt. Put another way, the discussion has been
entirely focused on the liability side of the household balance sheet. Some authors
have emphasised inequality as a factor increasing the demand for credit, while oth-
ers have pointed to ineffective regulation or misplaced government action as factors
which lay behind the ability of financial institutions to extend this credit. What has not
been discussion is the potential demand for assets on the part of households. Thus,
while the literature engages extensively with the idea that stagnant or falling incomes
at the bottom of the income distribution have given rise to increased indebtedness, the
implications of rapidly rising incomes at the top of the income distribution are ignored.
The tendency of commentators to overlook the role of wealth concentration in the
crisis is a puzzling one. As noted by Mishel et al. (2012), wealth inequality in the US
is greater than income inequality: The top 1%, next 9%, and bottom 90% shares of
income were 16.9%, 25.6%, and 57.5%, respectively in 2004. Shares of wealth were
34.3%, 36.9%, and 28.7%, respectively.
One contribution that does consider the role of wealth accumulation is the widely-
discussed paper by Kumhof & Rancière (2010). As already noted, in the canonical rep-
resentative agent general equilibrium models, the possibility that different groups of
individuals will hold different net financial financial positions are excluded by construc-
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tion. In order to overcome this, Kumhof &Rancière present an augmented DSGEmodel
in which “workers” borrow from “investors”. This is possible because “investors” are
characterised by a particular type of “real balance in the utility function” specification
in which financial wealth and physical capital exhibit different types of non-linearities.56
At the same time, the utility function of workers is altered so that instead of utility de-
pending on absolute levels of consumption, it is subject to a certain minimum or sub-
sistence level. In the context of imperfect competition, the model is then simulated by
applying a “bargaining power shock”, so that the real wage falls, but consumption does
not fall commensurately and workers thus borrow from investors to cover the short-
fall. The model is calibrated so that higher leverage ratios increase the probability of
a crisis arising from debt default.
The model does not shed much light on the question at hand, however. Rather it
primarily serves to illustrate the complexities of modelling essentially straightforward
phenomena related to inequality and debt within the confines of a neoclassical general
equilibrium model.
In Section 5.2, the macroeconomic effects of rising inequality are considered. It is
argued that the redistribution of income that has occurred, in favour of those that have
a greater saving propensity, has resulted in deficient aggregate demand. But what of
the saving of those households? The appropriation of an ever greater share of income
by those that save the greatest part of their income must inevitably lead to a rising
concentration of wealth among those households. In a series of papers, Lysandrou
(2011a,b,c) and Goda & Lysandrou (2011) argue that the demand for a means by which
wealthy households can store this wealth is an aspect of the crisis that has so far been
largely overlooked. In this view, the explosion of financial securities—both in value and
in complexity—were the result of a demand arising from the concentration of wealth
at the top of the income distribution. Lysandrou argues that “toxic assets were cre-
ated largely in response to external pressures, a principal source of which was global
inequality” (2011a, p. 323). With aggregate demand slackening—as a result of falling
or stagnant incomes relative to productivity for the great majority—the opportunities
for profitable business investment for the wealthy minority were dissipating. At the
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same time, there was a growth in demand for securities from institutional investors
and sovereign wealth managers, in part due to the rising global imbalances.
The effects of these dynamics can be seen in the falling yields of securities, even
as the supply of such securities continued to increase rapidly. In turn this “demand
for yield” from high net worth individuals brought hedge funds into the picture as the
conduit between wealthy individuals and the banking system. Feedback between the
banking system and the hedge funds, fuelled by the overwhelming demand for invest-
ment opportunities, led to ever greater heights of financial “engineering” and “innova-
tion”, aided and abetted by the drive for financial deregulation. These “innovations” in
turn allowed leverage ratios to rise ever further, and stimulated banks to react to this
search for yield by extending credit to poorer, higher risk, borrowers.
6 Concluding remarks
Over the last thirty years or so, the share of wages in national income has fallen in
the majority of countries for which data are available. In the Anglo-Saxon countries
in which either the labour share has not fallen, or has fallen less dramatically, other
measures of inequality have increased significantly.
The textbook answer to the question of why corporations and wealthy individuals
are appropriating ever-greater shares of output, while those who produce that output
see their incomes stagnate or fall is that this is a result of the inevitable process of
technological advancement. Striving for higher educational standards is the only way
to reverse the trend in developed nations.
This Deliverable has examined the evidence which underpins this argument and
demonstrated that the theoretical framework is deficient and the empirical evidence
flawed. The single-sector neoclassical model on which many of these studies are
based essentially rules out consideration of the systemic macroeconomic effects of
rising inequality, and in particular the possibility of an interaction between inequality,
financialisation and debt.
Amore convincing explanation is that rising inequality and a falling wage share have
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been driven by globalisation, deregulation and financialisation. The interaction be-
tween these factors is complex and overlapping, but the common thread is a policy
agenda which has systematically weakened the bargaining power of workers. As a re-
sult, an increasingly concentrated group of individuals have been able to appropriate a
growing share of national incomes.
This concentration of income in has, in turn, led to inadequate aggregate demand
and stagnationary tendencies in advanced economies. Two different and mutually re-
inforcing mechanisms for maintaining growth rates in the face of falling demand have
emerged in response: on the one hand, credit expansion to a household sector faced
with stagnant or falling real income and, on the other, a reliance on export growth.
In one group of countries, including the US, rising household indebtedness has been
accompanied by growing current account. These current account deficits provide the
external demand required for another group of countries such as, Germany and China,
which have run trade surpluses. At the other end of the income distribution, wealth
concentration, when combined with changes in institutional investment structures and
international imbalances, gave rise to an excess demand for financial assets, especially
dollar-denominated securities. Financial deregulation accomodated the emergence of
both the debt-led and export-led growth regimes and enabled the financial innovation
that was necessary to turn the resulting risk-laden debt stocks into apparently safe
financial assets.
Rising inequality of income is thus an important underlying cause of the financial
and economic crisis which broke in 2007–08. Blame cannot be pinned on any one fac-
tor: deregulation, liberalisation, globalisation, financialisation and technology have all
played important and inter-connected roles. More research is now required to disen-
tangle those roles.
Notes
1“It was known for some time that the share of wages and the share of profits in the national income has
shown a remarkable constancy in the ‘developed’ capitalist economies of the United States and the United
Kingdom since the second half of the nineteenth century” (Kaldor, 1957, pp. 591–592).
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2Kalecki noted that there was no reason to believe that this mechanism would remain in effect: “It is, of
course, not at all certain that in the future the rise in the degree of monopoly will continue to be compensated
by a fall in the price of basic rawmaterials. If it is not, the relative share ofmanual labour will tend to decline.”
([1939] 1990, p 248)
3This view is not shared by Mankiw who, in his widely-used macroeconomics textbook states that: “De-
spite themany changes in the economy over the past four decades [the] division of income is easily explained
by a Cobb-Douglas production function” (2007, p.55–58, quoted in Atkinson 2009). A somewhat more com-
plex explanation is given by Acemoglu (2003) who argues that the long-run constancy of factor shares can
be explained by a CES production function in which the elasticity of substitution is less than one and, in the
long-run, all technical change is purely labour-augmenting or “Harrod-neutral”. It is claimed that the labour-
augmenting technical innovations “selected” by profit-maximising firms will then exactly offset changes in
relative factor demands arising as a result of capital accumulation.
4High profile examples include Krugman (2007), Stiglitz (2010) and Rajan (2010).
5It is notable that in economies such as France and Japan in which wage dispersion has been less pro-
nounced, this has been accompanied by a stronger shift in the functional distribution in favour of profits. In
the Anglo-Saxon economies, the opposite pattern is found.
6See, for example, Levy (1998); Warren & Tyagi (2003).
7Such a measure thus excludes possible changes in the functional distribution arising from changes in
the overall sectoral composition such as changes in the share of interest income.
8In Capital in the 21st Century, 2014, Piketty presents series for the capital-labour split in Britain and
France which show a falling labour share in Britain from 1970 and from 1980 in France. These are derived
on the assumption that all non-capital income is labour income. Given Piketty’s main result of a rising share
of total income accruing to capital, the falling wage share is a logical implication.
9See Gollin (2002) for further discussion on adjusting for the income of the self-employed. Gollin con-
cludes that “estimated labour shares …are essentially flat over space and time” (p. 471).
10See also Krueger (1999); Gollin (2002); Feldstein (2008); Rupert (2012).
11See Horn et al. (2009) for summary figures of 50/10 and 90/50 ratios for other advanced economies. For
themale 90/10 ratio, the pattern in UK and Germany is similar to that of US, while Japan shows little change,
and France shows a decline. The 50/10 ratio is flat in most countries over the period, except for France and
Germany which show a decline and a significant increase respectively. The latter is likely driven by wage
repression at the bottom of the income distribution.
12Almost all of the capital gains income which accrues when such options are exercised is treated in the
national accounts as wages: “Nonqualified stock options (NQOs) are not considered income until exercised,
at which time the difference between the stock price on the day of exercise and the option price is treated
as ordinary wage income …[A]bout 95 percent of stock option grants involve NQOs and almost three-fourths
are exclusively NQOs.” (Goolsbee, 2000, pp 360–361)
13For an early survey of the evolution of this theoretical position, see Levy & Murnane (1992). See also
Autor et al. (2008).
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14The conceptual framework can be traced back to Tinbergen (1974) who inspired the title of Goldin &
Katz’s book:
My approach suggests that it depends on the ‘race’ between demand for third-level manpower
due to technological development and the supply of it due to increased schooling, whether the
reduction in inequality found for the last century, can be resumed after the stagnant period from
1950 to 1970. (p. 224)
15Acemoglu (1998) constructs a model which explains the decline in college premium in 1970, and sub-
sequent increase, using a rather elaborate disequilibrium version of Say’s Law: an increase in the supply
of college graduates stimulates further skill-biased technological change. Autor et al. (2003, 2006) present
models that purport to explain the loss of middle-class jobs by assuming that computers substitute differen-
tially for middle- and low-skill tasks while complementing higher-skill tasks. Ellis & Smith (2007) construct
a model in which different “vintages” of capital co-exist and obsolescence rates are rising due to technical
progress, leading to a weakening in the relative bargaining power of labour.
16I am indebted to Mark Setterfield for this point.
17Blanchard also notes that the relatively weaker declines in the wage share in Anglo-Saxon economies
might be explained by the fact that unions were already relatively weaker in those countries.
18According to anecdotal evidence, the term originates with Alan Greenspan.
19In this view, the notion that “rents” are distributed between labour and capital based on relative bar-
gaining strength—as in New Keynesian models—is rejected. If it is assumed that marginal costs are close
to constant then if the real wage is set equal to marginal cost, firms will never make non-negative profits.
20Local institutional and social factors also play an important role: “France, for example is a nation very
conscious of worker rights and the social wage, where a strike by the transportation workers’ union paralyze
the nation and where …workers regularly join in mass protests and demonstrations—but it has since World
War II had the lowest union density of any industrialized nation.” (Holt, 2007, p. 101)
21See Lavoie (1996) and Lee (1996) for discussion of the assumption of fixed marginal costs and Blinder
et al. (1998) for a recent empirical study.
22See Michell (2013).
23Blanchard (1997) argues that it is implausible that this mechanism could explain the shifts in income
distribution: “the shifts …could be interpreted as showing that firms have steadily increased their markups
in goods markets since the early 1980s. I find this explanation implausible. The period since the early 1980s
has been characterized by increased, not decreased, competition—especially so in continental Europe, with
the reduction of barriers to trade within the European Union. Phelps has argued that high real interest rates
since the early 1980s have led firms to care less about their customer base, and thus to go for highermarkups
and higher profit margins in the short run. But it is difficult to believe that this effect, to the extent that it has
been present, could have offset the effects of steadily stronger competition in goods markets over the past
fifteen years.” (p. 102)
24Krugman rejects the claim that both parties have shifted substantially to the right.
25Unsurprisingly, such conclusions coming from a high-profile commentator like Krugman drew the ire
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of conservative commentators: “Such a rosy-colored view of the past fails as objective historical analysis.
Instead, it amounts to ideologically-motivated nostalgia” (Lindsey, 2009, p. 3).
26“[I]nstitutions, norms and the political environmentmatter a lotmore for the distribution of income—and
…impersonal market forces matter less—than Economics 101 might lead you to believe” (p. 8); “This per-
sistence makes a strong case that anonymous market forces are less decisive than Economics 101 teaches”
(p. 137); “The idea that rising pay at the top of the scale mainly reflect social and political change, …strikes
some people as …too much at odds with Economics 101” (p. 145).
27Krugman argues that Levy & Temin have “led theway” in explaining the relationship between the political
environment and the Great Compression. He thus appears unaware of the rich literature on what economists
commonly refer to as the “Golden Age” of capitalism, eg. Marglin & Schor (1990)
28These authors, however, conclude that “WorldWar II and theNationalWar LaborBoard share some credit
for the Great Compression, but much was due to an increasing demand for unskilled labor when educated
labor was greatly expanding.” (p. 1)
29A similar position is taken by Piketty & Saez (2003) who argue that “…this pattern or evolution of income
inequality is additional indirect evidence that nonmarket mechanisms such as labor market institutions and
social norms regarding inequality may play a role in setting compensation at the top.” (p. 34)
30In contrast, Krugman concludes that the primary factor leading to the rise of neoliberalism (although he
doesn’t use the term) is racism: “The legacy of slavery, America’s original sin, is the reason we’re the only
advanced economy that doesn’t guarantee health care to our citizens. White backlash against the civil rights
movement is the reason that America is the only advanced country where a major political party wants to
roll back the welfare state.” (2007, p. 11).
31It is notable how careful these authors are not to acknowledge that their “discovery” is anything less
than entirely original.
32Palley (2013) refers to the partial and qualified acknowledgement of the significance of inequality by Ra-
jan and others as an example of “Gattopardo” economics, in reference to the film of the novel by di Lampe-
dusa: “Gattopardo economics takes on board ideas developed by critics ofmainstreameconomics, but it does
so in a way that ignores the thrust of the original critique and leaves mainstream analysis unchanged. Gat-
topardo economics makes change more difficult because it deceives people into thinking change has taken
place. By masquerading as change, it crowds-out space for real change.” (p. 1)
33“Data series proxying for our main candidate explanation, the rate of technological progress, are unfor-
tunately not available.…Therefore instead of measuring this phenomenon directly, we pursue amore indirect
method of including a linear time trend starting in the mid-1980s …” (Ellis & Smith, 2007, p. 14)
34A neat way to side-step these issues is found by Guscina (2006), who uses the growing gap between
labour productivity and remuneration as a proxy to determine the effects of technological change. She ar-
gues that “if compensation and employment shares rise with labor productivity, we can deduce that techno-
logical change is labor-augmenting, but if the opposite is true, technological change is capital-augmenting.”
The regression is set up with inequality specified as the dependent variable and labour productivity as the
independent variable. The resulting “especially strong and robust” correlation between productivity and in-
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equality leads to the conclusion that “the IT revolution …appears to have been capital-augmenting, lowering
labor’s share in countries whose productivity grew more rapidly.” (p. 11)
35For a history of the debates which lie behind these issues, see Harcourt & Cohen (2003).
36A recent contribution from two authors at the University of Chicago uses the neoclassical aggregate
production function approach in a different way to provide a theoretical explanation for the decline in the
labour share of income. Karabarbounis &Neiman (2013) assume a constant positive elasticity of substitution
in production between capital and labour. Then, faced with an exogenous (and unexplained) “investment-
specific technology shock” (p. 6) which reduces the price of capital, firms will substitute capital for labour
and the resulting decline in the relative demand for labour leads to a fall in the real wage and the labour share
of income. The authors argue that econometric testing demonstrates that their proposed effect “explains”
at least half of the observed falls in the labour share. The authors thus conclude that the SBTC story has
been overstated.
37They also find that effects of unions in reducing inequality are most significant for recent graduates.
38Stockhammer (2009) notes that the Scandinavian countries are part of the “Ghent” systemwhich requires
workers to be union members in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. Unionisation rates (and
changes) are thus not directly comparable with non-Ghent countries.
39See also Horn et al. (2009).
40In light of Godley’s prediction, and given the failure of standard New Keynesian models to even incorpo-
rate the potential for financial imbalances to play amacroeconomic role, there is a hint of irony to Krugman’s
recent evaluation of Godley’s approach to macroeconomics: “…Godley’s notion that we should represent be-
havior by rules of thumb isn’t something new—it’s something old, which got driven out of macroeconomics
…So why did hydraulic macro get driven out? Partly because …an analysis in terms of rational behavior
always trumps rules of thumb. But there were also some notable predictive failures of hydraulic macro,
failures that it seemed could have been avoided by thinking more in maximizing terms.” (Krugman, 2013)
41van Treeck & Sturn (2012) refer to this position as the “Krueger-Perri-Greenspan argument” (p. 11).
42Gordon & Dew-Becker (2008) go further and argue that the consumption survey data significantly under-
estimates the actual consumption of poor households because of an in-built bias in the CPI which serves to
exclude thewelfare-enhancing effects ofWal-Mart’s pricing behaviour on the consumption basket of those on
lower incomes, while simultaneously under-estimating the negative effects on those in higher income brack-
ets: “Both because low-income households shop at Wal-Mart, and because they spend a larger proportion
of their household income on food than high-income households, there is a prima-facie case that the retail
channel involvingWal-Mart …has significantly reduced the cost of living for lower-income households.…Many
high income households have never visited aWal-Mart. Their expenditures exhibit a higher share of services,
particularly high-end services like private secondary schools, college tuition, high-end spas, massage ther-
apists, landscape gardeners, and other service providers whose relative prices rise steadily relative to the
consumer price level” (p. 33). The authors also noted that “while the poor may do better when price indexes
are corrected, they do much worse when their health outcomes are considered.” (p. 45) and further, that
“lower-income people aremore likely to…eat unhealthy foods.” (p. 35) The possibility that a connection exists
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between the welfare-enhancing effects of shopping for groceries at Wal-mart and the welfare-diminishing
effects of consuming a less than nutritionally optimal diet appears to have eluded the authors.
43See also Katz & Autor (1998).
44A different approach is taken by Bordo & Meissner (2012) who use a panel analysis of 14 countries to
argue that, while credit booms do tend be followed by crises, no evidence can be found of a correlation
between inequality and credit booms.
45For further discussion of the shortcomings of these studies, see van Treeck & Sturn (2012, pp. 12–13).
46Friedman built upon the “life-cycle hypothesis” of Modigliani (Modigliani & Blumberg, 1954; Ando &
Modigliani, 1963). Modigliani had previously endorsed, then rejected, Duesenberry’s relative income hypoth-
esis. It has been speculated that the real purpose of Friedman’s attack on Duesenberry was to discredit
Keynes (Mason, 2000).
47The Greenspan-Krueger-Perri hypothesis in fact predicts the opposite outcome in terms of household
saving: higher insecurity and volatility might lead to greater gross debt, but the net financial position of the
household sector should improve as families react to greater uncertainty through increased precautionary
saving.
48See Lavoie (1996) and Lee (1996) for discussion of the assumption of fixed marginal costs and Blinder
et al. (1998) for a recent empirical study.
49See Michell (2013).
50See dos Santos (2013) for a critique of the neo-Kaleckian analytical framework.
51SeeLavoie&Stockhammer (2012) for an accessible introduction to the conceptual and theoretical frame-
work.
52Scholars writing from this viewpoint thus start with significantly different starting assumptions to those
postulated by “Economics 101”, from which Krugman faced such a long struggle of escape (see Section 3.3).
53Once the effects of changes in the real wage on the demand for exports is taken into account, the overall
growth regime of an domestically wage-led economymay become profit-led. Onaran & Galanis (2012) argue
that China provides the most striking example of such a system.
54The theoretical framework has given rise to a growing empirical literature which uses econometric tech-
niques to estimate consumption and investment functions for individual economies and thus classifies coun-
tries as either “wage-led” or “profit-led”. See, for example, Bowles & Boyer (1995), Stockhammer & Ederer
(2008), Stockhammer et al. (2009, 2011) and Onaran & Galanis (2012).
55A view which is essentially indistinguishable from this analysis was given by Fitoussi & Stiglitz, although
the authors do not, of course, acknowledge any of the post-Keynesian writers: “…aggregate demand defi-
ciency preceded the financial crisis and was due to structural changes in income distribution. As the propen-
sity to consume out of low incomes is generally larger, this long-term trend in income redistribution by itself
would have had the macroeconomic effect of depressing aggregate demand. In the US the compression
of low incomes was compensated by the reduction of household savings and by mounting indebtedness
that allowed spending patterns to be kept virtually unchanged. …Most European countries tread a differ-
ent path. The redistribution to higher incomes resulted in an increase in national savings and depressed
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growth. …These two paths were mutually reinforcing because the savings from the EU zone contributed to
the financing of US borrowing, along with surpluses of other regions. …Thus, the combination of structural
disequilibria that goes by the name of global imbalances resulted in a fragile equilibrium that temporarily
solved the aggregate demand problem on a global scale at the expense of future growth.” (Fitoussi & Stiglitz,
2009, pp. 3–4).
56“Our preferred interpretation is that agents derive direct utility from the prestige, power and social status
conferred by wealth” (p. 9).
64
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
Tables and Figures
Peak membership 2009
Country Rate (%) Year Rate (%) Decline (%)
Australia 46.1 1974 21.0 54.4
Austria 49.6 1988 40.1 19.2
Belgium 70.0 1995 69.6 0.6
Canada 33.3 1977 28.0 15.9
Denmark 86.2 1994 82.1 4.8
Finland 101.3 1993 94.6 6.6
France 26.2 1946 9.2 64.9
Germany 37.3 1991 28.5 23.6
Italy 53.3 1995 53.1 0.4
Japan 23.4 1975 17.9 23.5
Netherlands 33.9 1973 23.2 31.6
Norway 68.5 1996 67.8 1.0
Sweden 97.0 1994 92.9 4.2
Switzerland 31.8 1957 22.5 29.2
United Kingdom 53.0 1979 30.2 43.0
United States 26.4 1956 13.9 47.3
Table 1 – Decline in trade union membership rates.
NB. membership rates are defined as number of union members divided by labour force. Since union
members may include the unemployed and retired, rates can exceed 100%
Source: Friedman (2009).
Distributional outcome
Higher profit share Higher wage share




Table 2 – Growth implications of policy outcomes under different regimes.
Adapted from Lavoie & Stockhammer (2012, Table 4, p. 6)
65
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme








60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
UK US Japan









60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
Germany (W. Germany before 1992)
France
European Union (15 countries)
Figure 2 – Adjusted wage share as % of GDP at current factor cost, 1960–2012.
Source: EC (2013)
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Figure 3 – Functional distribution of income in developing countries
DVP3: unweighted average of Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey;
DVP5: unweighted average of China, Kenya, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey;
DVP16: unweighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Kenya, Mexico, Namibia, Oman,
Panama, Peru, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey
Source: Stockhammer (2012b)
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Figure 4 – Wage share in four large economies.
Reproduced from Karabarbounis & Neiman (2013)
Figure 5 – Trend wage share cross-country comparison.
Reproduced from Karabarbounis & Neiman (2013)
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Figure 6 – US non-farm business Labour Share.
Reproduced from Elsby et al. (2013)
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Figure 7 – Female wage dispersion in US.
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Figure 8 – Male wage dispersion in US.
Source: Mishel et al. (2012)
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Figure 9 – Personal income distribution.











Figure 10 – Composition of top 0.1% of personal income.
Source: Alvaredo et al. (2013)
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Figure 11 – US nonfarm business labor share split by income fractile.
Reproduced from Elsby et al. (2013, p. 36)
Figure 12 – Skill-biased technical change (SBTC).
Source: Acemoglu & Autor (2012)
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Figure 13 – Persons engaged in work stoppages in US as proportion of all workers.
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Figure 14 – US minimum wage, 2011 dollars.
Source: Mishel et al. (2012)
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Effect of change on wage share:
Figure 15 – Effects of financialisation on the wage share.
Adapted from Hein (2011, Table 3)
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Figure 16 – Trade union coverage and wage share.
Reproduced from Elsby et al. (2013, Figure 11)
Figure 17 – Trade union coverage and wage share.
Reproduced from OECD (2012, p. 138)
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